# Climate Refugees Neg

### Squo Solves

#### There are sufficient global legal protections for refugees – US not key

Zeghbib 18 Hocine Zeghbib is a Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Montpellier (Hocine, “What protection is there for ‘climate refugees’?” 2/5/18, <https://progressivepost.eu/protection-climate-refugees/>) // SR

Global warming and environmental degradation are leading to the forced relocation of millions of people, which, for ease of reference we shall refer to as ‘climate refugees’. Should substantive law, which is unsuitable to protect them, be amended, be totally reconstructed or replaced with pragmatic solutions?

Proven inapplicability of international law

The Geneva Convention on refugees is not applicable to the situation involving ‘climate refugees’, as demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 2015. As such, is it appropriate for the Convention to be amended, as argued by certain NGOs and as was reiterated without success at COP 23? That would amount to opening Pandora’s box. So is the solution to prepare a specific convention? If a specific convention is deemed appropriate how should the scope of such an instrument be defined? Do we refer to the people as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘environmentally displaced persons’? In short, the United Nations and their partners around the world now favour a regional approach to the issue and are abandoning the purely legal approach. The New York Declaration that has been weakened by the recent U-turn by the United States is an illustration of this.

Collaborative Research Solutions

The Nansen Initiative, strongly supported by the European Commission, seeks to meet the basic needs of ‘refugees’ by guaranteeing the right to personal integrity and to the family unit; the rights of the child; the reconstitution of civil status; the qualifications of people, etc. The 2015 agenda established, inter alia, mechanisms for cooperation between states within the same region, encouraged the development of emergency planning, the relocation of populations, the issuance of appropriate movement (travel) visas and temporary residence permits. Limits: non-binding text applicable only to persons crossing at least one border.

The Kampala Convention, offers a unique solution that aims to prevent and prepare for displacement in Africa: the Convention seeks to create and implement early warning systems, disaster risk reduction strategies, contingency measures and disaster management plans. The Convention is binding and encompasses all known causes of forced displacement including armed conflicts. Its limitation is that only internally displaced persons are referred to in the Convention.

On the European side, a motion for a resolution has been put forward that requires the Commission to draft “criteria that clearly defines climate refugee status”. The own-initiative report that would trigger the required procedure before Parliament is still missing.

Unilateral Research Solutions

Norway, Sweden, Finland: a secondary protection may be granted to persons resident overseas in circumstances where they are unable to return to their country of residence due to an environmental catastrophe. Denmark provides the same protection for women. These measures are rarely applied.

In the United States, the “Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) provides protection for residents and nationals of countries affected by wars, conflict or natural disasters, including Sudan, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Somalia, Haiti and provides them with said protection until such time as they can return to their country of residence. As a unique protection specific to “climate refugees”, the TPS has faced criticism from the Trump administration and has already been revoked for nationals from Haiti, and will in time be revoked for nationals from Honduras (2018) and Nicaragua (2019).

New Zealand which has previously developed bilateral agreements with Tuvalu on quota-based immigration is now considering creating a specific visa for ‘climate refugees’. Is this a real breakthrough or simply a rediscovery of the ‘humanitarian visa’?

Forced displacement and relocation of millions of people; inadequate legal protection; regional solutions which prove to be ineffectual and unable to cope: “…significant reparations can be achieved by the law: we, or more accurately, our children should have hope, for the future is not forbidden to anyone” (L. Gambetta), even less so to ‘climate refugees’.

#### Status Quo solves – New Zealand will act as a model to other countries

Adele Peters, 11-8-2017, a staff writer at Fast Company who focuses on solutions to some of the world's largest problems, from climate change to homelessness, There Will Soon Be Floods of Climate Refugees: Will They Get Asylum? Fast Company, <https://www.fastcompany.com/40491897/there-will-soon-be-floods-of-climate-refugees-will-they-get-asylum> //Frese

In 2012, a migrant worker from the tiny, low-lying Pacific island nation of Kiribati tried to become a refugee in New Zealand, arguing that he and his family were afraid to go home because of the impacts of rising sea levels. The courts didn’t accept that the dangers were imminent–or that they were due to reasons of persecution that are outlined in the international refugee convention–and rejected his claim. But people fleeing the effects of climate change on Pacific islands may soon have a new option: New Zealand’s new climate change minister hopes to create an experimental humanitarian visa for “climate refugees.”

“There’s a conversation just beginning in New Zealand, with the change of government, that makes lots of things that didn’t feel possible before now at least open for discussion,” says Vivien Maidaborn, executive director of UNICEF New Zealand, who has advocated for support for people in neighboring countries who may soon be forced to move.

If implemented, the new visa category could give up to 100 people a year admission to New Zealand because of climate change. (Because the potential visa is in the early stages of planning, it’s not yet clear what the requirements will be to get one.) It’s an early attempt to begin to address migration that will soon happen on a much larger scale. In Kiribati alone, climate change is likely to cause problems not only because some villages are submerged; saltwater is already affecting drinking water supplies and the ability to grow food. As ocean water acidifies, local coral reefs could suffer, affecting the supply of fish. Diseases, like dengue fever, could become more common. Similar problems will play out across other island countries.

By 2050 hundreds of millions of people around the world–or, by some estimates, as many as 1 billion–could be displaced because of environmental problems, such as drought and flooding, that are made worse by climate change. Some people will move within countries. In the U.S., for example, an entire community living on an island in Southern Louisiana is being relocated to higher ground within the state. But many will be forced to cross borders.

It may be unlikely that people forced to move because of climate change will ever be recognized as refugees under international law, which requires someone to prove persecution based on politics, religion, or other aspects of identity (though people who are official refugees aren’t afforded particularly good treatment, either). Climate change is indiscriminate. But a growing number of countries may do something similar to New Zealand.

New Zealand’s possible new visa isn’t completely unprecedented; some other countries already have “humanitarian visa” categories that have been used to respond to particular disasters. After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Brazil created a policy to temporarily accept Haitian immigrants. Argentina and Peru have created similar categories for people affected by disasters.

“This notion of humanitarian visas, legal pathways, and temporary protection are policy options that we are encouraging states to use,” says Atle Solberg, head of the coordination unit of the international Platform on Disaster Displacement.

There are challenges, at least with the policies that have existed to date in places like Brazil. “These categories are not really designed for the long haul, and for durable, lasting solutions,” he says. “That is particularly relevant if you think of some of the more negative effects in developing states. Let’s say it won’t be possible to return, and people will need to permanently leave some of these areas–then these tools may come up short in terms of the need for permanent solutions.” But if multiple countries create new pathways for migration, and begin to coordinate regionally, Solberg says that he thinks “it would go a long way” to help both in short-term crises and in the longer term.

In New Zealand, Maidaborn argues that the country could benefit from letting more people migrate. “I don’t want to fall into the trap of thinking that people from Pacific nations who are really threatened by climate change are victims,” she says. “A lot of world leadership has gone on from the Pacific around climate action . . . I think there’s lot of expertise, a lot of thinking and development and action, that’s gone on in the Pacific because it’s had to have gone on, and all that learning can be very applicable here.”

She believes that more countries will follow New Zealand’s example. “I think as a world, we’re going to see in much more material terms that our earth is a closed system . . . We sort of pretended that they’re all separate systems, and we’re coming very much face-to-face with the idea that it’s all connected. The solution will resolve us to act in an interconnected way.”

#### Status quo solves – international cooperation on migration is on the rise

Micinski and Weiss, '17 – \*Research and Editorial Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies and Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Graduate Center, City University of New York AND \*\* Presidential Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center and Director Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The City University of New York. (Nicholas R. and Thomas G., "Global Migration Governance: Beyond Coordination and Crises," The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2017, G. Ziccardi Capaldo ed., Oxford University Press, 2017, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3180639)//SB>

Momentum has accelerated for enhanced international cooperation on migration. In September 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which affirmed the human rights of migrants and refugees, condemning xenophobia, and committing to a new framework for comprehensive refugee responses.18 The General Assembly also agreed to bring the International Organization for Migration (IOM) into the UN system, which previously had lacked a designated agency for migration, although an opportunity was missed because IOM was denied a norm-setting role in the rights of migrants.19 The New York Declaration also committed to a two-year negotiation process for a Global Compact for Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees.

### Alt Causes / Climate Change not Key

#### There are many alt-causes to migration – price, political issues, language, ethnicity, religion and education

Hildegard Bedarff and Cord Jakobeit, 5/2017, Center for Research on the Environment and Development, University of Hamburg Faculty of Business Economics and Social Sciences, The University of Hamburg, <https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/20170524-greenpeace-studie-climate-change-migration-displacement-engl.pdf> //Frese

2.2. Households and individuals decide whether to stay or leave

The reasons for flight and migration are complex. Researchers have shown that migration is usually based on decisions made by households and individuals who are influenced in turn by many (often interconnected) push and pull factors.16 These decisions are often not voluntary, but attempts to ensure survival, escape extreme poverty, to live in dignity, or flee from violence, persecution and war. In some African states, entire villages will pool the means for travel and decide together which member of the village should migrate to later support the community with remittances, invitations for visa applications, and the like. It is almost impossible for the individuals selected to oppose this collective decision because they and their families would otherwise become isolated in the community.

The diagram illustrates the complexity of decisions regarding migration. Factors on three different levels influence the decision to stay or leave. At the macro-level, changes in politics, economics, society, environment, demographics and land use, as well as conflicts and war, play a role. Although each of these factors can be the most important driver of migration, people often decide to leave their home or stay when changes in several of these areas coincide. Changes in one area affect other areas, potentially causing the overall situation of inhabitants to greatly deteriorate (or improve). If climate change continues to advance, worsening or even destroying the livelihoods of more and more people, it will become a more significant factor. Of key importance, of course, is whether the targeted region or country will even permit entry and residence.

Specific contexts (meso-level in the diagram) also contribute to decisions on migration. Social networks in the homeland and in the diaspora can act both as drivers or inhibitors of migration. Agencies for recruiting workers outside the region simplify migration. Measures to adapt to climate change, such as local protection programs against hurricanes/cyclones or floods, and aid for post-disaster construction, can persuade people to stay or return. Not least, the costs of migration are crucial for deciding whether people can undertake the journey at all.

Poverty can be a driver of, or an obstacle to migration. The search for better livelihoods motivates people to migrate, but poor people in particular do not often have the financial means to do so. On the micro-level, it is not only prosperity/poverty and individual goals that play a role, but many other factors as well, such as language, ethnicity, religion, age, gender and education. The extent to which decision makers are informed about dangers, risks and opportunities is also of great importance. Many migrants and communities sending off a village member do not seem to know how dangerous it is to cross the Sahara and the Mediterranean, and how radically Europe is closing its doors to refugees. Research based on interviews has shown that island inhabitants in the South Pacific are not necessarily well-informed about the consequences of climate change. To be able to plan their lives, it is essential that islanders be aware that sea levels will continue to rise. To fill this gap in knowledge, Fiji has now introduced climate change as a subject at school.

#### Climate changes doesn’t correlate with more refugees – political stability is the primary reason

Mark Maslin, 6-12-2018, A Professor ff Earth System Science At University College London And Founding Director Of Rezatec Ltd, A U.K.-Based Geospatial Data Analytics Company, Undark, <https://undark.org/article/climate-change-migrations-conflict/> //Frese

THE DARFUR CONFLICT began as an ecological crisis”, wrote the then-UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon back in 2007, about an ongoing war which arose, he said, “at least in part from climate change.” Since then the idea that climate change has caused and will cause human conflict and mass migrations has become more and more accepted — just look at the claimed effects of droughts in Syria and Ethiopia.

The media has even started using terms such as “climate refugees” and “environmental migrants” to describe people fleeing their homes from these climate-driven conflicts. But it isn’t clear whether there is much evidence for this link between climate change and conflict — there certainly seems to be no consensus within the academic literature.

In our recent paper, my student Erin Owain and I decided to test the climate-conflict hypothesis, using East Africa as our focus. The region is already very hot and very poor, making it especially vulnerable to climate change (in fact neighbouring Chad is by some measures the single most vulnerable country in the world).

As the planet warms, East Africa’s seasonal rains are expected to become much more unpredictable. This is a particular problem as recent economic development has been concentrated in agriculture, a highly climate-sensitive sector that accounts for more than half of the entire economy in countries like Ethiopia or Sudan. One study led by the European Commission found that declining rainfall over the past century may have reduced GDP across Africa by 15-40 percent compared with the rest of the developing world.

East Africa also has a long history of conflict and human displacement, which persists in some countries to this day, such as the civil wars in Sudan and Somalia. The UN Refugee Agency reports there were more than 20 million displaced people in Africa in 2016 — a third of the world’s total. The World Bank predicts this could rise up to 86 million by 2050 due to climate change.

To test the climate-conflict hypothesis, Erin and I therefore focused on the 10 main countries in East Africa. We used a new database that records major episodes of political violence and number of total displaced people for the past 50 years for each of the 10 countries. We then statistically compared these records both at a country and a regional level with the appropriate climatic, economic, and political indicators.

We found that climate variations such as regional drought and global temperature did not significantly impact the level of regional conflict or the number of total displaced people. The major driving forces on conflict were rapid population growth, reduced or negative economic growth and instability of political regimes. Numbers of total displaced people were linked to rapid population growth and low or stagnating economic growth.

The evidence from East Africa is that no single factor can fully explain conflict and the displacement of people. Instead, conflict seems to be linked primarily to long-term population growth, short-term economic recessions and extreme political instability. Halvard Buhaug, a professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, looked at the same questions in 2015 and his study reached much the same conclusion: sociopolitical factors were more important than climate change.

Things were different for “refugees,” however — those displaced people who were forced to cross borders between countries. Refugee numbers were related to the usual demographic and socio-economic factors. But in contrast to total displaced people and occurrence of conflict, variations in refugee numbers were found to be related significantly to the incidence of severe regional droughts. And these droughts can in turn be linked to a long-term drying trend ascribed to anthropogenic climate change.

However, it is important to consider the counterfactual: had there been slower population growth, stronger economies and more stable political regimes, would these droughts still have led to more refugees? That’s beyond the scope of our study, which may not be a definitive test of the links between climate change and conflict. But the occurrence of peaks in both conflict and displaced people in the 1980s and 1990s across East Africa suggest that decolonization and the end of the Cold War could have been key issues.

Nonetheless, while conflict has decreased across the region since the end of the Cold War, the number of displaced people remains high. We argue that with good stable governance there is no reason why climate change should lead to greater conflict or displacement of people, despite the World Bank’s dire predictions. Water provides one reason to be optimistic. The UN reports that, over the past 50 years, there have been 150 international water resource treaties signed compared to 37 disputes that involved violence.

What our study suggests is the failure of political systems is the primary cause of conflict and displacement of large numbers of people. We also demonstrate that within socially and geopolitically fragile systems, climate change may potentially exacerbate the situation particularly with regards to enforced migration.

#### Climate change doesn’t cause conflict

Kita et. al 18 (Stern Mwakalimi, Research student in Geography at the University of Sussex, Environmental migration and international political security from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 358-359//waters)

Using similar datasets from similar geographical locations, other scholars have found no link between environmental change and conflict. Using an event coincidence analysis, Schleussnera et al. (2016) found that 23% of outbreaks of conflicts in countries with highly fractionalised ethnic groups coincide robustly with climatic disasters such as heat waves and droughts. They also found a 9% global coincident rate of armed conflict outbreak and occurrence of natural disasters. However, it is important to note that their study does not show any evidence of armed conflicts being directly triggered by climate-related disasters, but simply an occasional and infrequent temporal coincidence. In a study on the link between environmental scarcity and conflict in 39 Sub-Saharan countries, Bell and Keys (2016) identified three socio-political conditions that explain the link between environmental scarcity and civil conflict: social vulnerability, unequal resource distribution and the capacity of the state. Noteworthy is that the study found no evidence that drought increases the risk of armed conflict in fragile states, even those where socio-political conditions favour conflict outbreak. A study by Hegre et al. (2016) found no significant effect of temperature anomalies on the risk of conflict, but the authors did suggest that climate change may lead to low socioeconomic growth that may lead to further conflict. This could also affect investment in climate change adaptation and mitigation, especially in low-income countries. In a study on Sub-Saharan Africa, Buhaug et al. (2015) analysed data on climate variability, food production and conflict over a 50-year period and found no effect of food production shocks on the likelihood of conflict, dispelling the position that harvest failure and bad weather conditions contribute to violence in Africa. They argue that political and socioeconomic factors such as corruption, market failures and government policies better explain occurrence of civil unrest in times of food crisis. Investigating the possibility that climate affects conflict risk through economic challenges, van Weezel (2013) studied rainfall and conflict patterns between 1981 and 2010 in Sub- Saharan Africa and concluded that there is no robust link between rainfall failure, an important determinant of crop failure in Sub-Saharan Africa, and conflict onset, directly or indirectly. A study by Ayana et al. (2016) focused on pastoralists in East Africa, and found that livelihood stresses due to rainfall and forage yields fail to predict the occurrence and location of conflicts. Bergholt and Lujala (2012) have demonstrated that even the indirect link between climate change and conflict is suspect. The authors used historical data for the period 1980–2007 to show that severe and frequent climate-induced disasters create income shocks and affect Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of affected countries, but do not lead to conflict outbreaks directly or indirectly. Many studies result in counterclaims by other scholars, with the ensuing debates often centering on data and methods. For example, when Burke et al. (2009) claimed that Sub-Saharan African temperature increases contributed to conflict outbreak in the region, Buhaug (2010) questioned the veracity of such claims given the restricted time period used in the study by Burke and colleagues (the years 1981–2002), and suggested that the study used a purposefully narrow definition of conflicts, and other methodological oddities. Buhaug therefore reached an opposite conclusion: climate change and variability are poor predictors of conflicts in Africa. After recalibrating their models, Burke and colleagues found that the purported relationship vanished, and accepted that their earlier results were wrong (Aldhous, 2010). In another study, Hsiang and Burke (2014: 42) examined 50 quantitative studies and found “strong support for a causal association between climatological changes and conflict across a range of geographies, a range of different time periods, a range of spatial scales and across climatic events of different duration.”This led them to presume that the ‘climate security’ was firmly based in evidence. In response, Buhaug et al. (2014) identified three challenges with the study: across-study independence, causal homogeneity and sample representativeness. They employed the same method, but were not able to replicate the original results on climate change and conflicts using the same cases used by Hsiang and Burke (2014).

### Solvency Takeouts

#### The US doesn’t solve – hurricanes and poor infrastructure mean EDPs will be affected here too.

Orrin H. Pilkey et al. November 2017-- Orrin H. Pilkey is James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Division of Earth and Ocean Sciences, at Duke University. Linda Pilkey-Jarvis is a geologist at the Washington State Department of Ecology, where she helps manage the state's oil-spills program. Keith C. Pilkey is an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. ["Retreat from a Rising Sea", Accessible Online at: https://cup.columbia.edu/book/retreat-from-a-rising-sea/9780231168441] @ AG

What is to be done with the many hundreds of miles of high-rises jammed up against the sea around the world, most spectacularly in Florida? To move all these buildings is not economically feasible, but even if they could be moved, a suitable place for them would be difficult to find. One could build seawalls that would have to enclose the islands completely and grow bigger and higher with time, but these would destroy the very beaches that drew the construction in the first place. Preserving beaches for future generations is a compel- ling reason to retreat in response to sea-level rise. As former Florida governor Bob Graham asserted, “This generation doesn’t have the right to destroy the next generation’s beaches.” So for the sake of our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, we don’t have the right to build beach-destroying seawalls to save our beachfront buildings from sea-level rise.

We can’t begin to replenish (i.e., pump or truck in new sand) all of Florida’s beaches. Furthermore, much of Florida’s beachfront devel- opment is on permeable rock through which water will rise and flood behind seawalls or levees. Replacing cars with small boats might work until the waves from big storms roll through the community. Demol- ishing the high-rises would cost a fortune and produce a vast amount of water pollution, although modern demolition techniques could salvage and recycle large portions of the building materials. Thus, by the latter half of this century, much of the beachfront high-rise prob- lem will be in our laps to solve.

We humans find it hard to grasp the magnitude of changes that are under way, especially when the deniers try to confuse us. Sea- level rise is at the forefront of the expected changes, and if the higher estimates of sea-level rise rates are valid, a true global human catas- trophe by the end of this century is in the offing. Our perception of what is permanent or lasting will be challenged, even though nothing is happening with regard to the sea level that hasn’t happened before in the geologic past. The recent disasters intensified by rising seas are not random events without underlying causes. Indeed, climate changes, including the frequency of extreme events, have advanced to the point that we can no longer predict future events based partly on what has happened in the past.

Even events on the scale of Hurricane Sandy rarely result in imme- diate significant changes in coastal development patterns. In the 1980s, many coastal planners and scientists were saying that if just one more hurricane hit, surely things would change, and we would start moving back from the beachfront and prohibit further construc- tion in these extremely dangerous areas. Then along came Hurricane Hugo in 1989, and the idea of responding sensibly to the storm to pre- vent damage from the next inevitable storm was tabled.

At the time, South Carolina had a law that any beach house destroyed in a storm could not be replaced. This law was perhaps the most merciful and politically least controversial way to begin a retreat from the beach. But influential citizens with damaged houses howled, and the rules were changed so that if you could find the roof of your house, you could rebuild! When the dust cleared, Hurricane Hugo had become an urban-renewal project with many mom-and-pop cottages replaced by “McMansions” and even some high-rise condos. Several other post-Hugo hurricanes in the southeastern United States also proved to be urban-renewal projects when they should have been opportunities to retreat. These urban-renewal projects also have effectively priced out lower-income residents from the coast.

#### The aff fails – not quick enough, broadening refugees undermines funding and allow renegotiation to dilute obligations

W. H. 3-6-2018, writer for the Economist, Why climate migrants do not have refugee status, Economist, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/06/why-climate-migrants-do-not-have-refugee-status> //Frese

EACH morning, as the tide recedes, the people of the Marshall Islands check the walls that protect their homes from the sea. Sea levels in this part of the western Pacific are rising by 12mm a year—four times the global average—and countering them with sandbags, concrete and metal is a Sisyphean task. Eight islands in nearby Micronesia have been swallowed by the ocean in recent decades, and most of the Marshall Islands could follow by the end of the century. Here and elsewhere on the world’s fringes, the apocalyptic consequences of climate change have become reality. Many people will be forced to find new places to live. Forecasts vary, but one widely cited study, from the United Nations University, suggests that there will be 200m environmental migrants by 2050. Both migrants fleeing environmental disaster and those escaping war will be constrained in their choices. But currently only the latter may seek refugee status, and with it the right to safe asylum. Why?

On the surface, the problem is bureaucratic. Environmental migrants are not covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is designed to protect those fleeing persecution, war or violence. The UN agencies most involved in refugee rights, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme, agree that the term “climate refugee” should not be used to describe those displaced for environmental reasons. The UNHCR already struggles to provide adequate support for the world’s 22.5m refugees (from war and persecution). During the Syrian refugee crisis, it admitted to being “stretched to the limit”. If the UNHCR broadens its definition of “refugee” to support an entirely new category, it is unclear if the political appetite exists to provide the necessary funding.

Nina Birkeland, senior adviser for disasters and climate change at the Norwegian Refugee Council, says that the process of renegotiating the existing refugee treaty or creating a new one could take decades. Experts also worry that political opportunists, who regard the current refugee convention as being too generous, would use its renegotiation as an opportunity to dilute current obligations. Perhaps more importantly, some of those affected do not want to be called “refugees”. The former president of the central Pacific nation of Kiribati, Anote Tong, resisted the label, stressing that his people wished to “migrate with dignity”. Slowly unfolding disasters brought about by rising sea levels, desertification and droughts result in complex and often gradual patterns of movement. Their victims resist easy classification.

At the same time, New Zealand is set to become the first country to recognise the impact of climate change as grounds for a claim of asylum. The prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, has plans to create a special visa for Pacific Islanders forced to relocate because of rising sea levels. Though the scheme will only offer 100 visas annually, it sets a precedent. Indeed state-led solutions offer the best hope for such refugees. The Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), launched in 2016 by a coalition of national governments, will encourage countries to assist these migrants despite the lack of legal recognition of their plight. It builds on a “Protection Agenda” that 109 countries endorsed in 2015, and aims to integrate its principles into national laws. The PDD’s reach is more limited than that of the UN agencies. It cannot create new global legal standards. But supporters argue that it provides the most effective way to organise the necessary resources. With climate change set to cause new waves of migration, states cannot implement new rules quickly enough.

#### The US has it’s own climate issues – the plan would exacerbate them

Pilkey et al 16 – professor of Earth and Ocean science at Duke, geologist in the State of Washington’s Department of Ecology, and professor of mechanical engineering at Queen’s Univesity (Orrin, Linda, and Keith respectively, “Coastal Calamaties”, “Retreat from a rising sea”, 2 May 2016)//abaime

Other ﬂat, low-lying stretches of land next to the sea include the northeastern corner of mainland North Carolina, which is one of three areas in the lower 48 states most threatened by sea-level rise. The Mississippi Delta and South Florida are the other two areas with this distinction. The mainland behind the Outer Banks of North Carolina is a broad, ﬂat, swampy area (including the Great Dismal Swamp) surrounding Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. Compared with the residents of the barrier islands facing the sea, the mainland folks are, on average, less prosperous, less visible, less educated, and less influential in the North Carolina political scene. Probably more than 100 small towns, some consisting of a few houses and usually a church, are located there, and many have an elevation of less than 5 feet. Some of the larger towns include Manteo (population 1,340), Manns Harbor (821), Elizabeth City (18,470), Swan Quarter (324), Bath (247), Aurora (520), Washington (9,744), Columbia (863), and Plymouth (4,107). In 2011, the Category 1 Hurricane Irene aﬀected much of the area, ﬂooding the lower portions of most of these towns and inundating almost all of Manteo. As usual, the news media in North Carolina concentrated on Irene’s damage to the buildings on the barrier islands on the Outer Banks and almost ignored the detrimental eﬀects on the mainland villages. In 2010, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) gave North Carolina a $5 million grant to map the northeastern corner of the state, including maps of the predicted storm-surge levels with various sea-level rise scenarios of 1.5 feet, 3 feet, and 5 feet likely to occur by the year 2100. This kind of information is critical to community planners, to individuals building or buying houses with the hope of eventually leaving them to their children, and also to industry scouts seeking new locations for businesses and factories. Unfortunately, fearing the impact on real-estate prices and local economies, the state government prohibited the publication of the storm-surge maps, which now sit in a drawer in a cabinet in someone’s oﬃce. This reckless, irresponsible act by the state government lost it a critical opportunity to begin considering its options, including planning a gradual retreat from one of North America’s areas most threatened by sea-level rise.

#### **Climate refugees are impossible to define -- other factors contribute to migration**

Wyman 13 (Katrina Miriam, Professor of Law at NYU School of Law, Responses to Climate Migration, https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/helr37&id=211, pg. 200-202//waters)

In addition to the moral qualms that we may have about designing a new binding legal instrument to assist solely climate migrants, any proposal for such an instrument also presents practical problems. As mentioned above, it may be difficult in practice to identify persons who migrate due to climate change be- cause migration decisions are typically the result of several factors. 66 While the environment may influence migration decisions, environmental considerations are rarely the sole factor determining the decision to migrate. The multi- migration to climate change.'67 Setting to the side the prevailing multi-factorial understanding of migra- tion decisions, B&B, D&G, and HEA recommend definitions intended to confine the beneficiaries of their proposals to climate refugees or climate change displaced persons.'68 It is questionable whether the proposals' definitions would cover all people migrating because of climate change while excluding people migrating for other reasons, assuming, as the proposals must, that it is possible to identify people moving because of climate change. B&B propose to "restrict the notion of climate refugees to the victims of a set of three direct, largely undisputed climate change impacts: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."' 61 9 In addition, B&B propose to differentiate the level of funding available from their Climate Refu- gee Protection and Resettlement Fund based on the extent to which the eligible impact can be causally linked with climate change. Full reimbursement would be available for the incremental costs due to sea-level rise on the basis that "general causality with climate change is undisputed" while only "additional funding" would be available for migration due to the other climate impacts on the basis that climate might be "only one causal factor to account for environmental degradation."' However, if the goal is to assist climate migrants, B&B's highly specific definition of climate refugee might be under-inclusive. As D&G argue, B&B's decision to restrict eligibility to persons moving due to three types of climate impact "does not take into account the possibility that advances in science could enable more accurate determination of which events are caused by cli- mate change."'' Thus B&B's restrictive list of impacts risks excluding from coverage persons who are displaced due to impacts that future science suggests are climate impacts. In addition, B&B's definition includes a number of exclusions that could be questioned. The definition excludes persons who migrate for reasons that B&B deem indirectly related to climate change, "such as international or na- tional conflicts over diminishing natural resources."'172 For example, while B&B would cover refugees from drought, they would not cover persons who flee conflicts triggered by the same drought.173 B&B also would exclude per- sons who migrate due to efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change, such 1 74 as the building of dams or planting of "biofuels crops."' There is a smaller risk that B&B's definition also could be over-inclusive. Future science might suggest that components of the three types of impacts that B&B would cover should not be attributed to climate change. Also, as B&B acknowledge, extreme weather events, drought, and water scarcity generally may be linked to climate change, but climate change also might be only one factor contributing to them. B&B's effort to address this multi-causality by limiting the funding for migration due to these environmental impacts to "addi- tional" funding begs the question of how the Climate Refugee and Resettle- ment Fund would ensure it reimburses only for the portion attributable to climate change.'75 If the Fund paid for more than the migration due to climate- related drought damage, it would overpay in B&B's terms. Conversely, it would underpay if it paid for less than the migration due to climate-related drought. D&G limit the beneficiaries of their proposal by defining a "climate change refugee as an individual who is forced to flee his or her home and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as the resultof a sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which humans more likely than not contributed."176 D&G envis- age that a "body of scientific experts" created by their proposed convention would define the disruptions that the convention would cover and periodically review whether disruptions should be incorporated into or removed from the 177 eligible list. HEA largely follow D&G in attempting to circumscribe the beneficiaries of their proposal by limiting them to persons moving due to events that are "consistent with climate change and to which humans very likely contributed," rather than itemizing a list of covered climate change impacts. 78 However, HEA argue that their "'very likely' standard" would make it harder than D&G's "'more likely than not' standard" to gain coverage, and accordingly their standard would better target resources to assist persons moving due to assist policymakers in applying the definition. Is0 The open-endedness of the definitions of D&G and HEA may detract from their efforts to assist climate migrants but only such migrants. D&G and HEA emphasize that the IPCC has been able to identify impacts "as 'consistent with"' climate change."'1 They also are confident in the ability of science to indicate whether environmental disruptions consistent with climate change are related to human actions, based again on the work of the IPCC.82 However, in characterizing a type of disruption as consistent with climate change or related to human activity, scientists will likely be making judgments amid uncertainty. Moreover, they presumably will be doing so with the knowledge that their characterizations of disruptions may influence policymakers' determinations about eligibility for protection under the climate migration instrument." 3 If the scientists are apt to err on the side of over-inclusion in the face of uncertainty, eligibility might be extended beyond the limits that D&G and HEA envisage. On the other hand, if the scientists are inclined to err on the side of under- inclusion in the face of uncertainty, eligibility might be overly constrained. The open-ended definitions of D&G and HEA carry the danger of de facto delegating their conventions' breadth of coverage to a body of scientists. Despite the difficulties with each proposal's definition of the intended ben- eficiaries, it may be possible to devise a definition that in principle would protect climate migrants and only those migrants. Nonetheless, the difficulties underscore that it will not be easy to craft such a definition. Moreover, because of the multiplicity of factors influencing migration, it may not be possible in practice to ascribe many migration decisions to climate change.

### Canada – AT//Populism IL

#### No backlash against immigrants – Canadian opinion is high.

Stephen Smith 3-22-2018 – Reporter for the Canada Immigration Newsletter. ["Majority of Canadians remain in favour of immigration, new study finds", Accessible Online at: https://www.cicnews.com/2018/03/majority-of-canadians-remain-in-favour-of-immigration-new-study-finds-0310368.html] @ AG

A majority of Canadians continue to hold positive views about immigration and its impact on Canada’s economy, a new public opinion survey has found.

Conducted in February, the annual Focus Canada survey by the Environics Institute and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation interviewed 2,000 Canadians over the age of 18.

Despite the hardening of views against immigrants in the United States and Europe, the study found that most Canadians continue to view immigration in a mainly positive light.

This chart shows responses in favour or against the statement ‘Overall, there is too much immigration to Canada.’ Source: Environics Institute

“Canadians as a whole continue to be more positive than negative about the current levels of immigrants coming to this country, and with the legitimacy of refugees who have been arriving,” the study says, noting that “worldwide, Canadians are among the most accepting of immigrants in their country.”

Overall, 60 per cent of those surveyed expressed a favourable view of immigration. This jumped to 80 per cent who see immigration having a positive impact on Canada’s economy. Only 16 per cent of Canadians disagreed with this view.

“The positive impact of immigration is the majority view across the population, and the upward shift is evident across across most groups but especially in Quebec and the western provinces, while holding steady in the Atlantic provinces and Ontario,” the study notes.

The survey results were published on the same day Statistics Canada revealed that international migration was the main driver of an increase in the country’s population in the last quarter of 2017. It also follows a report on Canada’s Atlantic provinces that says the retention of immigrants to the region is crucial for its economic survival.

To find out if you are eligible for any Canadian immigration programs, fill out a FREE assessment form.

Integration concerns waning

The positive view of immigration was balanced by the fact 51 per cent of those surveyed said too many immigrants are not adopting Canadian values. This percentage, however, was the lowest since the survey began asking Canadians about this issue in 1993.

Across Canada, positive opinions on immigration and refugees are more widespread in the province of British Columbia, where 66 per cent disagreed with the view that “overall, there is too much immigration in Canada.” The same percentage of Canadians aged 18 to 29 and second-generation Canadians also disagreed, as did 69 per cent of Canadians with a university degree.

Negative views of immigration and refugees were more widespread in the province of Alberta, among Canadians above the age of 60 and those with only a high school education.

Alberta also led Canadian provinces in the number of respondents who believed too few immigrants were adopting Canadian values (62 per cent). This view, meanwhile, was lowest in British Columbia and Manitoba / Saskatchewan, where 46 per cent of respondents shared this view.

Attitude toward refugees remains positive

The admission of 40,000 Syrian refugees since 2015 and the arrival of nearly 50,000 asylum seekers in Canada last year has not dampened Canadian support for refugees.

Of those surveyed, 45 per cent said they believe most people claiming to be refugees are legitimate compared to 38 per cent who believe they’re not. Environics said uncertainty has replaced some of the more strongly held views on the issue that it found in 2017, with 17 per cent now saying they have no clear opinion on the legitimacy of refugee claims, an increase of seven points.

“This softening trend is evident across much of the population, but is most noticeable in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan,” the study says, adding this was also the case in Quebec, which was the focus of the asylum seeker influx in 2017.

Negative perceptions of refugees tend to increase with age, decrease with socio-economic status, and are more prevalent among men and immigrants.

90% of Canadians feel their city is good for immigrants

Environics also shared the findings of the 2017 Gallup World Poll, which is conducted each year in 140 countries. This study found Canadians holding some of the most positive views about their cities as a welcoming place for immigrants.

This chart shows the percentage of Canadians who believe their city is a good place for immigrants to live. Source: Environics Institute

More than nine in 10 Canadians (92 per cent) said the city or area where they live is “a good place” for immigrants. This is an increase of four points over 2016.

“Canadian public opinion on their community as a place for immigrants is significantly more positive than for all other 34 OECD countries (where the average is 65 per cent), and has been consistently so since 2006,” the study says.

Overall, Canada was ranked third by Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index, which measures comfort levels and attitudes to immigrants. Only Iceland and New Zealand outranked Canada.

These findings mirror the recently released World Happiness Report, which surveys immigrants about their sense of well-being in their adopted countries. Canada ranked seventh in the world in terms of immigrant happiness, which Environics said parallels that of native-born Canadians.

#### Canada is resilient to populism – the political system is designed to minimize extremism.

Amanda Taub 6-27-2017 – Reporter for the New York Times. ["Canada’s Secret to Resisting the West’s Populist Wave", Accessible Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/canada/canadas-secret-to-resisting-the-wests-populist-wave.html] @ AG

A Different Kind of Identity

In other Western countries, right-wing populism has emerged as a politics of us-versus-them. It pits members of white majorities against immigrants and minorities, driven by a sense that cohesive national identities are under threat. In France, for instance, it is common to hear that immigration dilutes French identity, and that allowing minority groups to keep their own cultures erodes vital elements of Frenchness.

Identity works differently in Canada. Both whites and nonwhites see Canadian identity as something that not only can accommodate outsiders, but is enhanced by the inclusion of many different kinds of people.

Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot, several people told me — a place that celebrates different backgrounds rather than demanding assimilation.

“Lots of immigrants, they come with their culture, and Canadians like that,” said Ilya Bolotine, an information technology worker from Russia, whom I met at a large park on the Lake Ontario waterfront. “They like variety. They like diversity.”

Identity rarely works this way. Around the world, people tend to identify with their race, religion or at least language. Even in the United States, an immigrant nation, politics have long clustered around demographic in-groups.

Canada’s multicultural identity is largely the result of political maneuvering.

A Liberal Party worker distributed signs commemorating Canada’s 150th anniversary in Toronto’s Little Italy on June 17.CreditCole Burston for The New York Times

In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau faced a crisis amid the rise of French Canadian separatism in Quebec. His party was losing support, and his country seemed at risk of splitting in two.

Mr. Trudeau’s solution was a policy of official multiculturalism and widespread immigration. This would resolve the conflict over whether Canadian identity was more Anglophone or Francophone — it would be neither, with a range of diversity wide enough to trivialize the old divisions.

It would also provide a base of immigrant voters to shore up Mr. Trudeau’s Liberal Party.

Then, in the early 2000s, another politician’s shrewd calculation changed the dynamics of ethnic politics, cementing multiculturalism across all parties.

Jason Kenney, then a Conservative member of Parliament, convinced Prime Minister Stephen Harper that the party should court immigrants, who — thanks to Mr. Trudeau’s efforts — had long backed the Liberal Party.

“I said the only way we’d ever build a governing coalition was with the support of new Canadians, given changing demography,” Mr. Kenney said.

He succeeded. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, the Conservatives won a higher share of the vote among immigrants than it did among native-born citizens.

The result is a broad political consensus around immigrants’ place in Canada’s national identity.

That creates a virtuous cycle. All parties rely on and compete for minority voters, so none has an incentive to cater to anti-immigrant backlash. That, in turn, keeps anti-immigrant sentiment from becoming a point of political conflict, which makes it less important to voters.

In Britain, among white voters who say they want less immigration, about 40 percent also say that limiting immigration is the most important issue to them. In the United States, that figure is about 20 percent. In Canada, according to a 2011 study, it was only 0.34 percent.

Courting Ethnic Groups

Even as politicians engineered a pro-diversity consensus, immigrant and minority groups have organized, unapologetic about asserting their interests.

In Canada, because all parties compete for all ethnic blocs, minorities do not tend to polarize into just one party. That leaves little incentive for tribalism, even as minority groups feel empowered to champion their ethnic or religious identity.

“We say, ‘Look, where do you stand on particular issues of importance to us?’” said Kulvir Singh Gill, a member of Toronto’s powerful Sikh community. “And on the basis of that, we’ll be selective in our support.”

This month, Mr. Gill helped organize a fund-raiser dinner for Seva Food Bank, a Sikh-led charity he co-founded

The event was crawling with politicians. Senior members of Canada’s three main parties were present, as were several members of Parliament and the provincial premier, Ontario’s equivalent of governor. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Pierre Trudeau’s son) had recorded a video to open the dinner.

All were seeking support from Canada’s Sikhs — but all were going to have to work for it.

Mr. Gill attributed this to “a real maturation in the community,” with Sikhs cultivating ties to all three parties, ensuring that the Sikh voice would be represented no matter who holds office.

Other minority groups have pursued this strategy, too. As a result, while minorities in other countries feel pressure to assimilate, in Canada they do best when they retain a strong group identity.

Political science research suggests that this dynamic may have also made Canada resistant to political extremism and the polarization plaguing other Western countries.

Lilliana Mason, a professor at the University of Maryland, has found that when group identity and partisan identity overlaps, that deepens partisan polarization and intolerance against the opposing party.

But because Canadian politics accounts for diversity without polarizing across ethnic or religious lines, it is more resilient. Everyone, including whites, becomes less likely to see politics as a game of us versus them.

#### Canada won’t become a populist nation

John Geddes, 3-7-2017, Ottawa bureau chief at Maclean's and has covered federal politics and policy for more than two decades, Canada's last lines of defence against populism Macleans.ca <https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/canadas-last-lines-of-defence-against-populism/> //Frese

A week after Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States last Nov. 8, Conservative MP Ted Falk rose in the House of Commons during the time set aside for “members’ statements,” which falls just before question period and is, as a rule, politely ignored. Falk represents the Manitoba riding of Provencher, hard by the windswept Minnesota border, and he spoke brieﬂy of the “special relationship we have with our long-time friends and neighbours” to the south. Then he ﬁnished up with, “May God continue to bless America—God bless Donald Trump.”

That last part raised eyebrows among the many who take it for granted that Canadians had recoiled en masse at Trump’s win. But back home in southeastern Manitoba, often referred to as the province’s Bible belt, Falk’s words weren’t controversial. His constituency is largely evangelical Christian, reliably conservative and shares a lot in common with the American voters who made Trump president. (Falk declined to be interviewed for this story.)

In fact, Canadian conservatives in general tended to welcome Trump’s win. An Ekos Research poll, which happened to be released on the day Falk rose in the House, found that while only 30 per cent of Canadians approved of Trump, fully 57 per cent of declared Conservative supporters viewed the new president favourably.

The populist energy stored in that reservoir of pro-Trump sentiment has to be taken seriously by Canadian Conservatives, especially those now vying for the federal party’s leadership. From the Liberal perspective, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has lately reafﬁrmed his old warning of a populist backlash unless government policy reduces economic inequality. And, further left, MP Charlie Angus launched a bid for the NDP leadership last month by urging his party to redeﬁne itself in opposition to Trump-style populism.

All this attention to populism takes on a real-world urgency in light of what’s been happening—among other places on the Canada-U.S. border—along that stretch of the 49th parallel separating Manitoba from Minnesota, mentioned in the House by Falk. It’s there, as most Canadians have heard in news reports, that undocumented migrants have been crossing by the dozen—often trekking for hours across snowy ﬁelds in bitter cold—to leave Trump’s America behind and take their chances with Canada’s refugee process, maybe after warming up ﬁrst over coffee at Little Jay’s Café in Emerson, Man. (pop. 700).

The prospect of a growing number of asylum-seekers slipping into Manitoba—and Quebec and British Columbia—is shaping up as an early test of Canada’s mood in the Trump era. Will the phenomenon ultimately beneﬁt the Liberals, highlighting again Trudeau’s welcoming embrace of newcomers? Or will a perceived challenge the migrants pose to law and order reward a sterner rhetorical response from Conservatives, as it has in the U.S. and Europe, and help spark what is routinely labelled a “populist” upsurge on the right?

Exactly what’s meant by populist isn’t always easy to pin down. Broadly speaking, though, the term is used most often these days to capture what happens when politicians on the right tap anxieties over mass migrations, linking those fears with underlying discontent over scarce jobs and stagnant wages for less-educated workers. In other words, populism means Trump’s rise in the U.S., the Brexit referendum vote to pull Britain out of the European Union and the serious challenges various right-wing parties pose in a string of European elections set for this year.

Could that same recipe be cooked up in Canada? Trudeau’s election triumph in 2015, followed by his celebrated welcome of more than 40,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, had many observers portraying Canada as almost uniquely immune to the inward-turning instinct behind Trump and Brexit.

Yet Frank Graves, the veteran Ekos pollster, has tracked and quantiﬁed similar strong currents coursing through Canadian conservatism. “The idea that a populist leader couldn’t win in Canada, that we couldn’t have an analogue to Trump, is I think nonsense,” Graves says.

His public opinion research shows pessimism about the economic outlook and misgivings about diversity. For instance, Ekos polling found back in 1995 that 81 per cent of Canadians agreed that “cultural diversity” contributed positively to Canadian identity. Asked the same question early last year, only 66 per cent rated diversity as having a positive impact.

Then there’s economic unease. According to Ekos, the percentage of Canadians who view themselves as middle-class has plummeted from nearly 70 per cent around 2002 to below 50 per cent last year. Few adult Canadians think the next generation will fare better economically than theirs has. And presented with the statement “If the current patterns of stagnation among all except those at the very top continue, I would not be surprised to see the emergence of violent class conﬂicts,” Ekos found that 57 per cent of Canadians agreed.

Combine hopelessness about economic prospects with a magniﬁed sense of the risks out there in the world, and Graves says the result is, among some Canadians, a growing hankering for more order—even a tendency to accept authoritarianism.

“That type of outlook is much more receptive to the idea that we need a strongman who’s going to make decisive government actions to deal with this,” he says. “So he’s going to build a wall, or he’s going to deport illegal immigrants, or he’s going to bomb enemies.”

Graves is careful to stress that being primed to accept right-wing populist messages isn’t a majority mindset in Canada. These tendencies are, not surprisingly, by far most pronounced among avowed Conservative voters, and particularly in places like Alberta. Which raises the question of how the Conservative party—and its 14 aspiring leaders—might adjust in the Trump era.

Other researchers also point to Canadian attitudes that appear receptive to a Trump-like message. For a recent McGill Institute for the Study of Canada conference in Montreal, University of Toronto political science professor Michael Donnelly analyzed an online survey of 1,522 Canadians conducted by the polling ﬁrm Ipsos and found scant evidence that Canada is particularly big-hearted when it comes to outsiders who want in.

Donnelly reported that when Canadians were asked how much they agree or disagree with the statement “The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status,” their tendency to be generous ranked a middling ninth out of 22 countries. Canadian generosity only outranked Britain’s by a notch, and was just modestly ahead of Germany—both countries widely regarded as having struggled to accept immigrants. “Whatever is driving Canada’s exceptionally positive history of immigration and integration over the past half century,” Donnelly concluded, “it does not appear to be an exceptionally tolerant public.”

Note that he didn’t say, however, that Canada’s world-famous reputation for integrating newcomers is undeserved—only that it can’t be chalked up mainly to national niceness. Perhaps the most persuasive case for why Canada really does better than the U.S. and most European countries when it comes to fostering diversity has come from researchers who focus not on Canadians’ attitudes, but on Canada’s immigration policies and the political system.

It starts with the demographic clout of Canada’s foreign-born voters. They made up 20.6 per cent of the total population in the 2011 census, the highest proportion among the G8 countries, far higher than the roughly 13 per cent in both the U.S. and Germany. It also matters that the vast majority of Canadian immigrants choose to live in big cities in Ontario, B.C., Quebec and Alberta.

University of Toronto political science professor Phil Triadaﬁlopoulos stresses how immigrants to Canada become voting citizens more quickly than in other Western democracies, and how potent their votes have become in Canadian elections. “They don’t remain outsiders,” Triadaﬁlopoulos says. “Politically, they become insiders very quickly.”

In an inﬂuential 2013 paper entitled “Immigration, Citizenship and Canada’s New Conservative Party,” Triadaﬁlopoulos and two co-authors, McMaster University’s Inder Marwah and Carleton University’s Stephen White, note that 84 per cent of eligible immigrants in Canada become citizens, compared to just 75 per cent in Australia, 56 per cent in Britain, and a mere 40 per cent in the U.S.

They emphasize research showing that voting among immigrant Canadians roughly matches turnout rates among native-born Canadians, and that immigrants are more likely than voters born here to pay attention to election news, including watching televised leaders’ debates.

Even more crucially, immigrants in Canada tend to cluster﻿﻿ in Toronto and Vancouver, in what most political party election strategists view as key ridings. “To alienate large numbers of immigrant voters in dozens of federal ridings would almost certainly mean surrendering those ridings to other parties,” Triadaﬁlopoulos, Marwah and White write.

Still, they point to “grassroots conservative opinion” that often seems resistant to high levels of immigration and policies promoting multiculturalism. That leads to what Triadaﬁlopoulos, Marwah and White dub a “populist’s paradox” facing right-of-centre Canadian political leaders, who must ﬁnd ways to speak to their base while also broadening their “ethnic” appeal.

It’s a dilemma that’s familiar to Preston Manning. He remembers coping with anti-immigrant bigots when he was leader of the upstart Reform party in the 1990s. “We had wild meetings,” Manning recalled in a recent interview. “Our ﬁrst week in the ’97 campaign, we had ‘Let the People Speak.’ It was like Russian roulette. I would get up there and say, ‘Rather than us telling you what this election is about, you’re going to tell us what it’s about.’ There would be some good, ordinary people, but there would always be some nutcase who’d get up.”

Manning says he would try to politely disavow the nutcase’s anti-immigrant (or sometimes anti-Quebec) ideas without denouncing the individual. He now heads the Calgary-based Manning Centre, which trains Conservative political operatives, conducts research and holds a key annual gathering of the Canadian right in Ottawa.

At this year’s conference, held in late February, Manning urged Conservatives to try to harness the energy of Trump-era populism, rather than only “denounce and decry” its dark side. Talking of grassroots Conservatives who worry that multiculturalism and immigration threaten “Canada’s national values and identity,” Manning advised against “contemptuously dismissing [their] concerns.”

But allowing anti-immigrant views any room to breathe has proven strategically risky. Former Tory prime minister Stephen Harper laboured hard to make inroads among immigrant voters, relying largely on tireless outreach efforts by Jason Kenney (who has left federal politics and is now seeking the Alberta Progressive Conservative leadership). It paid off big in the Conservatives’ 2011 majority election win, which netted the Tories 32 of 47 seats in Toronto and its suburbs, where immigrants made up about half the population.

Then came the 2015 election reversal. Facing Trudeau’s challenge, the Conservatives stoked the part of their base that was alarmed by Islamic extremism or fundamentalism by proposing a ban on face veils during citizenship ceremonies, which Harper even said he would consider broadening to the federal public service. The Conservatives would also strip the Canadian citizenship of dual nationals convicted of terrorist offences and set up a “barbaric practices tip line.”

Chris Alexander, the former Conservative immigration minister who lost his Toronto-area seat in the 2015 election, later admitted that non-Muslim immigrant communities he didn’t anticipate would feel directly threatened by these controversial policies found them deeply unsettling. Those immigrant-heavy ridings swung almost entirely back to the Liberals.

“It was clear to me, and it’s even clearer in retrospect, that in urban Canada we were already in danger of being perceived as somehow an unwelcoming party,” Alexander, who is now running for the federal Tory leadership, said in an interview. “That was, in my view, undeserved. But in political terms, it was a disaster.”

Are Conservatives inclined to ﬂirt with the same disaster again? Among the federal party’s 14 current leadership aspirants, Kellie Leitch, who proposes subjecting would-be immigrants to a Canadian “values test,” is clearly taking that gamble. She seems to be an outlier, though. Kevin O’Leary, seen by many as the race’s front-runner—and whose business and reality-TV resumé, and promises to slash taxes, invite Trump comparisons—shows zero inclination to mimic the president’s identity-politics blustering.

Tom Flanagan, a University of Calgary professor emeritus of political science and former Reform and Conservative campaign manager, says the Canadian way of selecting party leaders would likely frustrate an insurgency like Trump’s anyway. The U.S. primary system allows any American to vote for presidential nominees, so Trump was able to court votes from a broad, disaffected public. Canada’s next Conservative leader will be picked only by paid-up party members, which Flanagan says is a harder group for a risk-taking populist outsider to win over.

In any case, there’s just no Tory leadership aspirant who has the makings of a Canadian version of the current occupant of the White House. “Kellie Leitch is a very pallid imitation of Trump,” Flanagan says. “Kevin O’Leary isn’t even interested in the same kind of issues.”

If the Canadian election map makes taking an anti-immigrant line a losing proposition, and the Canadian way of choosing party leaders makes it hard for a populist outsider to win, there’s still the possibility that the Conservatives might try to activate the economic side of populism.

Even there, though, the formula behind Trump and Brexit doesn’t look like a natural ﬁt in Canada. Trump blended his anti-immigrant rhetoric with promises to scrap or overhaul free-trade agreements. The Brexit forces linked discomfort with foreigners to resentment of the EU free-trading order. But in Canada, liberalized trade enjoys broad buy-in—particularly on the political right, and notably in the Conservatives’ resource-exporting western strongholds.

So echoing Trump and the Brexiters in railing against unfair foreign competition is a non-starter for Canadian Conservatives. That leaves, perhaps, ﬁnding a way to give voice to the anxieties of that broad swath of Canadians who, as Graves portrays them, fear that the middle class is shrinking and that opportunities for their children and grandchildren are dwindling.

But the Tories would ﬁnd themselves playing catch-up with the Liberals when it comes to tailoring a populist message for those worried voters. Trudeau has been arguing since 2014 that failure to push income growth down from high-earners to middle-class families would eventually prompt a dangerous backlash. His answer, or at least part of it, came in last year’s budget, in the forms of a modest middle-income tax cut, an upper-income tax hike and a signiﬁcant boost in federal payments to parents.

Is more policy in the same vein coming in next month’s 2017 budget? In a signiﬁcant recent speech in Germany, at Hamburg’s annual St. Matthew’s Day Banquet, Trudeau strongly suggested he isn’t done trying salve that middle-class sense of grievance. “With the pace of globalization and technological change,” he said, “there is a very real fear out there that our kids will be worse off than we are.”

Adopting his own version of the populist line, Trudeau took direct aim at corporations that post record proﬁts but somehow can’t afford to offer job security to their workers. “Increasing inequality has made citizens distrust their governments, distrust their employers,” he added. “It turns into ‘us vs. them.’ ”

From the sounds of his Hamburg speech, Trudeau doesn’t intend to leave the next Conservative leader any easy opening to outdo him when it comes to giving voice to the disquiet of Canadians who believe the economic order is stacked against their families. It remains to be seen what additional policies the Liberals unveil in the upcoming budget to back up that rhetoric.

If Trudeau fails to deliver, a right-leaning populist might seize the chance to try to ﬁll the vacuum. Overall, though, the prospects for a right-of-centre populist movement in Canada look dim, even though opinion in Canada, according to pollsters like Graves and academics like Donnelly, contains plenty of the same mix of fear and pessimism that fuelled Trump and Brexit.

There’s no shortage of Canadians who, if they’d heard Ted Falk wishing God’s blessing for Donald Trump, might well have said, “Amen.” But if they’re hoping that Trump-style populism will slip across the border and succeed in Canadian politics, they’re likely to discover that Canada’s welcoming reputation has its limits.

#### Double bind – either Canadian populism is inevitable or it won’t happen

Scott Gilmore, 3-7-2017, a former diplomat and social entrepreneur who works in (and writes about) the United States, Africa and Asia, Does Canada have too many immigrants? Macleans.ca <https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/how-populism-is-taking-over-the-world/> //Frese

Populism, at face value, seems almost healthy. Or at least to me it does. I was raised in Alberta, a populist heartland. It was accepted as a fact that the government chronically ignores “the people.” Men like Ralph Klein, who drank in a rundown pub and boasted about his lack of education did well there. Ralph, as he was universally known, painted himself as an outsider, the only one looking out for the roughnecks and the farmhands. And we ate it up.

But after I moved overseas, it didn’t take me long to realize populism isn’t just backslapping good ol’ boys. I found that from Indonesia to England, “rule by the people” almost always ends up undermining democracy.

At the heart of every populist movement is the idea that the establishment has to go. There is no grand theory of economics or social policy. There is the idea that the people are being hurt by the powers that be—and that makes the establishment illegitimate. Therefore, the only legitimate candidate is the populist. He or she is on the same side as the people, and electing him or her means the people will be back in charge. As Trump himself explained during his inaugural address: “Jan. 20, 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.”

Because the current way of doing politics is illegitimate, populists scorn it by acting out. Their supporters love the “honesty” of their transgressions, sexual escapades and illicit opinions. This erodes the political system. Consider the United States. In the next election cycle, will voters see sexual assault or tax evasion as a disqualiﬁer?

The populist is the avatar of the people, the embodiment of their will. If somehow they lose the election, then the people’s will was subverted; the election was corrupt, or there was a conspiracy to stop them. Spreading doubt about the electoral system further erodes democracy and the public’s trust in institutions.

Even after taking power, a populist still needs an opponent. This means attacking the bureaucrats, policies and systems that were in place when he arrived. The battle against the establishment is constant, and success is a zero-sum game, measured by how much the other guys lose. In the end, the greatest casualties are actually the institutions that keep a democracy relatively stable.

There is one other foil that populists almost always target: immigrants, minorities and foreigners. In France, the populists blame Muslims (8 per cent of the population). In Indonesia, it’s the Chinese (1 per cent). In the United Kingdom, it’s the Jews (0.5 per cent). It doesn’t matter how small or powerless these groups are, they are held responsible for any setback or failure suffered by a populist government or movement.

Right now, it feels like populism is surging globally. In the U.K., we have seen the rise of the anti-immigrant UKIP party and the success in the Brexit vote to leave the European Union. Across the channel, the polls are predicting the anti-Muslim, anti-European Union party of Geert Wilders may form the largest party in the Netherlands’ parliament. Similarly, in France, the Front National’s Marine Le Pen is being boosted by her ability to blend centrist policies with strong anti-immigration messages.

In Hungary, the anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban gave a speech this week calling for more “ethnic homogeneity.” Not surprisingly, he also wants closer ties to Russia. There, Vladimir Putin is the most inﬂuential populist in the world. At home, he has pushed an agenda of nationalism, while energetically subverting elections. Abroad, Russia has actively supported populist movements everywhere: money to Le Pen in France, leaked emails for Trump and clandestine support for the Brexit campaign in the U.K.

Another new friend of Russia is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He has become increasingly populist while greatly expanding his powers. Further south, in Africa, the past decade has seen a marked increase in populist movements in countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. In Asia, the Philippines elected an anti-intellectual strongman who boasts about breaking the law. And in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power railing against a corrupt and ineffectual status quo and making abusive comments against the Muslim minority.

Which brings us to Canada. Will we see a similar rise in populism here? When I sat down to write this column, my instinctive answer was “no.” I agreed with many of the arguments made by my colleague John Geddes, who sees systemic and political barriers to Canadian populism. My thinking was that the apparent growth in global populism is because we are focused on Trump and starting to pay attention. But where I could ﬁnd data, it didn’t support my conclusion. One study from Harvard, for example, found that support for populist parties on both the left and the right has grown undeniably and steadily since the 1960s, doubling its support since then.

But it was another study completed late last year by a group of academics from the U.S., Europe and Japan that left me especially troubled. They looked at a dozen European countries to see if there was a correlation between the relative size of the immigrant population and the support for right-wing populist movements. The researchers found that there was a direct connection, and that support grew at an increasing rate as the size of the immigrant population grew. And what is more, their data suggested there was a “tipping point” in western societies: when immigrants comprised 22 per cent of the population, support for anti-immigrant parties approached a political majority. If a country takes in too many immigrants, a populist backlash may be unavoidable.

In Canada, our foreign-born population is already at 20 per cent and growing. This is far higher than in the United States and (except for Luxembourg and Switzerland, where there are large numbers of itinerant professional residents like bankers) it is far higher than in any other European nation. And it’s getting bigger. Statistics Canada just released a report that projected Canada’s immigrant population will increase to between 26 per cent and 30 per cent within two decades. This puts Canada well beyond the theoretical 22 per cent threshold in the European study.

It makes sense that countries become unstable with too many foreigners. I have ﬁrst-hand experience in places like Pakistan and Timor Leste, where sudden massive inﬂuxes of refugees can pull a country apart at the seams. But is it possible that even when immigrants arrive gradually and they are integrated successfully, it can still destabilize a country? Perhaps a populist backlash is inevitable in Western democracies when the immigrant population grows to a certain size.

This is not because the newcomers bring crime or undermine our democratic institutions (they do neither), but because the native citizens, whether they are Canadians or Austrians or Americans, instinctively feel threatened by newcomers. Perhaps the experiences add up—new faces on TV, new clothes in the street, new music on the radio—until the average person reaches a tipping point and pushes back. After all, a fear of strangers is wired into our brains, an instinct that kept us alive in our tribal past.

If this is true, it upends a lot of assumptions that this country is built on regarding multiculturalism, pluralism and immigration. Canada may be facing larger global forces, tectonic shifts which are are not felt until it’s too late and a populist earthquake shatters our carefully built house of peace, order and good government.

#### Canadia won’t become populist – there are many checks

Amanda Taub, 6-27-2017, Former human rights lawyer, now covering foreign policy, human rights, and shetland ponies, Canada’s Secret to Resisting the West’s Populist Wave, The New York Time, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/canada/canadas-secret-to-resisting-the-wests-populist-wave.html> //Frese

TORONTO — As right-wing populism has roiled elections and upended politics across the West, there is one country where populists have largely failed to break through: Canada.

The raw ingredients are present. A white ethnic majority that is losing its demographic dominance. A sharp rise in immigration that is changing culture and communities. News media and political personalities who bet big on white backlash.

Yet Canada’s politics remain stable. Its centrist liberal establishment is popular. Not only have the politics of white backlash failed, but immigration and racial diversity are sources of national pride. And when anti-establishment outsiders have run the populist playbook, they have found defeat.

Outsiders might assume this is because Canada is simply more liberal, but they would be wrong. Rather, Canada has resisted the populist wave through a set of strategic decisions, powerful institutional incentives, strong minority coalitions and idiosyncratic circumstances.

While there is no magic answer to populism, Canada’s experience offers unexpected lessons for other nations.

A Different Kind of Identity

In other Western countries, right-wing populism has emerged as a politics of us-versus-them. It pits members of white majorities against immigrants and minorities, driven by a sense that cohesive national identities are under threat. In France, for instance, it is common to hear that immigration dilutes French identity, and that allowing minority groups to keep their own cultures erodes vital elements of Frenchness.

Identity works differently in Canada. Both whites and nonwhites see Canadian identity as something that not only can accommodate outsiders, but is enhanced by the inclusion of many different kinds of people.

Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot, several people told me — a place that celebrates different backgrounds rather than demanding assimilation.

“Lots of immigrants, they come with their culture, and Canadians like that,” said Ilya Bolotine, an information technology worker from Russia, whom I met at a large park on the Lake Ontario waterfront. “They like variety. They like diversity.”

Identity rarely works this way. Around the world, people tend to identify with their race, religion or at least language. Even in the United States, an immigrant nation, politics have long clustered around demographic in-groups.

Canada’s multicultural identity is largely the result of political maneuvering.

In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau faced a crisis amid the rise of French Canadian separatism in Quebec. His party was losing support, and his country seemed at risk of splitting in two.

Mr. Trudeau’s solution was a policy of official multiculturalism and widespread immigration. This would resolve the conflict over whether Canadian identity was more Anglophone or Francophone — it would be neither, with a range of diversity wide enough to trivialize the old divisions.

It would also provide a base of immigrant voters to shore up Mr. Trudeau’s Liberal Party.

Then, in the early 2000s, another politician’s shrewd calculation changed the dynamics of ethnic politics, cementing multiculturalism across all parties.

Jason Kenney, then a Conservative member of Parliament, convinced Prime Minister Stephen Harper that the party should court immigrants, who — thanks to Mr. Trudeau’s efforts — had long backed the Liberal Party.

“I said the only way we’d ever build a governing coalition was with the support of new Canadians, given changing demography,” Mr. Kenney said.

He succeeded. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, the Conservatives won a higher share of the vote among immigrants than it did among native-born citizens.

The result is a broad political consensus around immigrants’ place in Canada’s national identity.

That creates a virtuous cycle. All parties rely on and compete for minority voters, so none has an incentive to cater to anti-immigrant backlash. That, in turn, keeps anti-immigrant sentiment from becoming a point of political conflict, which makes it less important to voters.

In Britain, among white voters who say they want less immigration, about 40 percent also say that limiting immigration is the most important issue to them. In the United States, that figure is about 20 percent. In Canada, according to a 2011 study, it was only 0.34 percent.

Courting Ethnic Groups

Even as politicians engineered a pro-diversity consensus, immigrant and minority groups have organized, unapologetic about asserting their interests.

In Canada, because all parties compete for all ethnic blocs, minorities do not tend to polarize into just one party. That leaves little incentive for tribalism, even as minority groups feel empowered to champion their ethnic or religious identity.

“We say, ‘Look, where do you stand on particular issues of importance to us?’” said Kulvir Singh Gill, a member of Toronto’s powerful Sikh community. “And on the basis of that, we’ll be selective in our support.”

This month, Mr. Gill helped organize a fund-raiser dinner for Seva Food Bank, a Sikh-led charity he co-founded.

The event was crawling with politicians. Senior members of Canada’s three main parties were present, as were several members of Parliament and the provincial premier, Ontario’s equivalent of governor. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Pierre Trudeau’s son) had recorded a video to open the dinner.

All were seeking support from Canada’s Sikhs — but all were going to have to work for it.

Mr. Gill attributed this to “a real maturation in the community,” with Sikhs cultivating ties to all three parties, ensuring that the Sikh voice would be represented no matter who holds office.

Other minority groups have pursued this strategy, too. As a result, while minorities in other countries feel pressure to assimilate, in Canada they do best when they retain a strong group identity.

Political science research suggests that this dynamic may have also made Canada resistant to political extremism and the polarization plaguing other Western countries.

Lilliana Mason, a professor at the University of Maryland, has found that when group identity and partisan identity overlaps, that deepens partisan polarization and intolerance against the opposing party.

But because Canadian politics accounts for diversity without polarizing across ethnic or religious lines, it is more resilient. Everyone, including whites, becomes less likely to see politics as a game of us versus them.

“We’re an articulation of that Canadian dream, the Sikh Canadian dream, of living our values and putting them into action,” Mr. Gill said.

Making Mass Immigration Work

Rapid changes in demographics tend to spur anti-immigrant sentiment within the dominant group, experts say, bolstering far-right politicians who promise harsh tactics against outsiders.

But although Canada’s high immigration rates have transformed the country in just a few decades, the public has mostly been calm and accepting.

One reason may be Canada’s unusual immigration policies. A sponsorship system, in which Canadian families host newcomers, allows communities to feel they are a part of the country’s refugee resettlement program.

And a points system, which favors migrants who are thought to contribute economically, makes immigration feel like something that benefits everyone.

As a result, immigration is broadly accepted as positive, closing off a major avenue of populist mobilization.

Ahmed Hussen, the federal immigration minister, said “the luck of geography” had also helped make immigration feel less threatening.

Virtually every immigrant to Canada is brought here deliberately. Research suggests that uncontrolled immigration, for example the mass arrival of refugees in Europe, can trigger a populist backlash, regardless of whether those arrivals pose a threat.

“We have the luxury of being surrounded by oceans on three sides, and then by the U.S. border,” Mr. Hussen said. “Which, relative to your southern border, doesn’t have the same amount of irregular migration.”

Immo Fritsche, a professor at the University of Leipzig, in Germany, has found that when people feel a loss of control, they cling more closely to racial and national identities. And they desire leaders who promise to reassert control.

European populists have run on such promises, and by accusing political establishments of selling out their countries to migrants. President Trump’s promise to build a border wall is, at its core, a promise of control.

But Canada’s points- and sponsorship-based systems, along with its geographic position, help communities feel a sense of control over immigration so that, even as new arrivals change politics and society, backlash has been minimal.

The Face of Canadian Populism

The result is a system tilted heavily against populist outsiders.

Although some have found local success, particularly in Quebec, they have not managed to get national traction. At the end of my time in Toronto, I attended a conference held by The Rebel, an online news media channel that is often called “Breitbart North” and once seemed like Canada’s populist vanguard.

Like the American outlet Breitbart News, it has risen on dark warnings about Shariah law and nefarious elites.

Last year, as the populist wave rose worldwide, The Rebel threw tacit support to a handful of politicians. One, Kellie Leitch, received airtime and praise as she sought to push populism into the mainstream.

But this year, when Ms. Leitch ran for the leadership of the Conservative Party, a major test of populism’s appeal in Canada, she won less than 8 percent of the vote, placing sixth.

When I attended The Rebel’s daylong conference in Toronto, I saw no politicians drumming up support — a sharp contrast to the Seva gala the night before.

Tara Cox, a yoga teacher, said she had some concerns about Shariah law, but quickly added that “a Syrian family moved to our small town, and everyone has rallied around them.”

When a speaker warned of Muslim no-go zones in “every hamlet, every village” in Britain, saying that the same could happen in Canada, there were no bellows of rage from the audience, only courteous murmurs of concern.

This was the face of Canadian populism. As their counterparts fan out across Europe and the United States, flexing their political muscle against frightened establishments, here was a listless, modestly sized crowd, whose members seemed aware that they had underperformed but unable to explain why.

#### Canadian populism won’t happen – many checks and it won’t be driven by immigration

Tom Flanagan, 11-17-2016, professor emeritus of political science and a distinguished fellow at the School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, The political context in the US and Europe is very different from that in Canada; the next Canadian populist movement will be a new political party, Policy Options Politiques, <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2016/could-a-populist-wave-also-sweep-canada/> //Frese

Many observers see similarities among Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential election, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, and right-wing populist or conservative-nationalist parties in Europe; for example, the National Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria, and Jobbik in Hungary. Is any of this relevant to Canada?

Left-leaning Canadian politicians are already condemning anything they don’t like as Trumpism, recalling the days of Bush Derangement Syndrome, when Canadian conservatives were automatically labelled “clones of Dubya.” And indeed, some Conservative politicians are echoing selected Trumpian themes, as in Kellie Leitch’s misguided call for a values-test for would-be immigrants to Canada (I fear I would be among the first immigrants to be deported!). But there will be no full-fledged New Right in Canada, because the conditions driving these developments elsewhere are largely absent here.

A major factor behind the rise of the New Right in Europe is the confrontation with political Islam. Europe is close to North Africa and the Middle East, where political convulsions are producing millions of refugees. Many refuges seek safety in Europe, even though they may have little desire to assimilate into Europe’s Christian or post-Christian secular civilization. Major cities such as Brussels have no-go areas, into which even the police are reluctant to enter except with overwhelming force. Spectacular terrorist incidents are common. European nations, from Spain to Austria and Poland to Bulgaria, have historical memories of fending off invasions from the Moors and the Turks. It is thus no surprise that many voters are turning to political parties that promise a stronger stand against the threat of Islamism.

In the United States, the confrontation with radical Islam takes a somewhat different form. Islamic refugees are not close at hand, but the international role of the United States has involved it in endless wars and proxy conflicts in Islamic territory — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — such as Somalia, Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. In addition to that, there is the problem of 11 million illegal immigrants, who have mostly come across the long and porous border with Mexico.

None of these conditions apply to Canada, which is located far from the trouble spots of the Middle East and Latin America. We annually admit a large number of immigrants relative to the size of our population, but the majority are selected through the point system or come through family reunification. We even get to choose many of the refugees who resettle here. Illegal immigrants are a minor problem of law enforcement, not a serious social issue. We have no common border with a major source of refugees or economic migrants. Our cities do not have no-go zones of Muslims or any other immigrant group. Episodes of Islamic terrorism have occurred, but on a much smaller scale than in other Western countries.

No major Canadian political party in recent decades has taken an anti-immigrant position. Of course, there are debates over immigration policy, such as the weighting of economic vs. humanitarian considerations, or how to manage refugee flows, but all parties support the concept of large-scale immigration and actively compete to win the support of immigrant voters. Internationally, we have participated in some of the Middle Eastern wars, but never as major combatants.

In the United Kingdom, the surrender of sovereign authority to the European Union produced a backlash, which led to the Brexit referendum. (Fans of the “Yes, Minister” TV series will remember Jim Hacker’s defence of the British sausage.) But again, this has no relevance to Canada. NAFTA is a trade agreement with the United States and Mexico. It does not involve surrendering sovereignty and it did not create a North American machinery of government.

Finally, Donald Trump’s success in the United States was partially driven by growing income inequality. His margin of victory came from states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, which have been particularly hard hit by de-industrialization and job loss. The phenomenon is real enough, even if unfair trade agreements are not the real cause. Canada, however, is different. The Gini index of inequality rose in Canada during the 1990s but stabilized in the 21st century, while American indicators of inequality have kept on rising. We are closer to European social democracies than to the United States in levels of poverty, concentration of wealth in the hands of the “1 percenters,” and overall income distribution. Thus there is not the same basis for a political movement based on economic ressentiment as there is south of the border.

For all these reasons, the wave of populist politics taking place in the United States and many European countries is not likely to wash up in Canada. But over a longer time frame, Canada has a powerful tradition of populism extending back about a century, which includes the Progressive Party, the Social Credit League, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The most recent large-scale manifestation was Preston Manning’s Reform Party, founded in 1987. Reform’s success was due to the inability of the Laurentian elites to control runaway deficit spending and to put up effective resistance to Quebec separatism. The Reform Party subsequently entered mainstream politics through Stephen Harper’s merger with the Progressive Conservative remnant; but, as Manning once said, when populist movements die, “the seeds go back into the ground.”

One thing is reasonably certain: the next Canadian populist movement, when it does emerge, will take the form of a new political party. A Trump-style takeover of an existing party is almost inconceivable in Canada, because party members choose the leader; there is no primary system that would allow an outsider like Trump to surge to the forefront. Unlike an American president, a Canadian prime minister is not elected as an individual but is the leader of a party with a dominant number of seats in the House of Commons. There is nothing like the American primary system that allowed Trump to run for president under the banner of a major party.

Party discipline has proved to be essential to parliamentary government, but every public opinion poll shows that voters dislike it. Thus, political mavericks frequently attempt to found new parties representing views that can’t get a fair hearing in the major parties. Most such attempts fail, but talented leaders such as William Aberhart, Tommy Douglas, Preston Manning and Lucien Bouchard occasionally manage to upset the applecart of conventional wisdom. Populist rebellions are the main source of creativity in Canadian political history, but the Laurentian elites always condemn them, unless and until they can co-opt them. Instead of fear-mongering about the falling sky and the end of civilization as we know it, elites here and abroad would be better advised to seek to understand how their own failures give rise to these populist movements.

#### Trudeau will ensure that Canada resists populism

Reich and Marsden, '17 – \*Former U.S. Labor Secretary; professor of public policy at the University of California at Berkeley AND \*\*political strategist (Robert and Rachel, "Rachel Marsden: Why Canada has resisted populism," chicagotribune, 2-7-2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/sns-201702071330--tms--amvoicesctnav-b20170207-20170207-column.html)//SB

PARIS -- In the run-up to the recent U.S. presidential election, a lot of conservatives began using the term "cuck" to describe "cuckolded" males beholden to leftist policies. Lately, some conservatives have been applying that rather unflattering term to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, one of the few Western leaders staying the globalist course while other countries opt for a greater degree of national security.

When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a 90-day immigration ban on refugees and visa holders from certain Muslim-majority nations, Trudeau responded on Twitter: "To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada."

The tweet was celebrated by open-borders activists worldwide.

What was much less reported than Trudeau's welcome to refugees was the fact that Canada has actually capped private sponsorship of Syrian and Iraqi refugees for this year at 1,000.

So that's good news for Canadians worried about national security, right? Don't worry about Trudeau's tweet, because the government is putting a tight cap on refugee sponsorship.

Except that it's the much greater number of government-sponsored Syrian refugees that isn't being capped so strictly.

Canada has taken in 39,671 Syrian refugees since November 2015. According to the government's own data, most of them are unskilled, lack higher education and don't speak either English or French. A recent survey by the Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia noted that only about 17 percent of B.C.'s government-sponsored refugees are actually working. Most of those who have found jobs are working in retail, hospitality, manufacturing and construction -- relatively unskilled sectors that pit them against locals for employment. Many of those among the first wave of refugees are now complaining about their one-year resettlement assistance money running out.

Trudeau consistently leverages discrepancies between image and reality -- illusions that can be used to appease both the left and right sides of the political spectrum.

Take Trudeau's repeated declarations about the importance of climate change, which have helped him win over environmental activists. Trudeau nonetheless applauded Trump's recent revival of the Keystone XL pipeline despite the project being at the top of environmentalists' hit list in both Canada and the U.S.

It's not a foolish strategy that Trudeau is employing. It's difficult to convince people to rebel against a leader who appeases potential opponents by saying all the things they want to hear. Voters tend to pay attention to sound bites and proclamations, which are a lot more compelling than parliamentary votes.

To illustrate yet another blurring of image and reality: Canada is now the second-largest arms exporter to the Middle East (behind the United States), according to IHS Jane's, which tracks military spending. In 2014, under then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada landed a $15 billion deal to provide combat vehicles to Saudi Arabia -- the foremost sponsor of the Islamic State, which is responsible for flooding Western nations with migrants. The "humanitarian" Trudeau government approved the export permits for those vehicles.

A recent Ipsos survey suggests that Canadians are less concerned about external threats than Americans, with only 39 percent of Canadian respondents agreeing that the country needs to "take more steps to protect itself from today's world" (versus 47 percent of the Americans surveyed). Canadians generally like their government to leave them alone and not to muck around too much, lest the politicians screw something up.

The manner in which a country's citizens react to the adverse effects of globalization can be significantly attributed to that country's history. Canada doesn't have the revolutionary history of the United States or France, and Canadians tend to pride themselves on diplomatic thoughtfulness over brute force in response to challenges. Canadians usually just "vote the buggers out" long before protests spill into the streets.

Trudeau benefits from the fact that Canada never fully bought into globalism. The country has had the good sense to avoid donning the economic straightjacket that Europe got itself into, favoring the sort of balanced trade agreements that the United Kingdom is now seeking in the wake of the Brexit vote. Canada also benefits from having a lot of space and an ocean separating it from the cultural tsunami that Europe is currently experiencing.

Canada doesn't have the same sense of urgency that other Western nations have in this era of anti-globalist backlash. The two-faced approach currently being taken by Trudeau and the Canadian government mostly has citizens blissfully ignorant or confused. Fog of war isn't a bad strategy as long as people don't notice a negative change in their daily lives -- and the Canadian government has yet to see what happens when people do.

#### Canada’s refugee policy explicitly excludes climate refugees – they wouldn’t go to Canada anyways absent the plan

Musampa ’17 – November 17, 2017, Benjamin Musampa holds an MA in International Law and International Politics from Universite de Sherbrooke, “How will Canada handle climate refugees?” <https://cusjc.ca/bootcamp/o-zone/how-will-canada-handle-climate-refugees/> // shurst

Abdul Kadir arrived in Canada in 2007 after spending three years in a Kenyan refugee camp. Political instability and recurrent armed conflicts were the primary reasons Kadir, now 55, left his country. But there was another, less obvious factor forcing him to flee: environmental disasters caused by human and natural forces. “Food scarcity, the lack of infrastructure and the absence of rain falling … made my daily life very miserable and difficult to survive,” Kadir said. Abdul Kadir sits in his office at Ottawa’s Somali Centre for Family Services. Kadir requested that his face not be shown in any photos. According to a report released by Oxfam, nearly 11 million people like Kadir living around the Horn of Africa face severe hunger this year due to increased droughts caused by climate change and political conflict. International bodies such as the United Nations have warned that the number of environmental migrants is likely to rise worldwide due to climate change. Political instability and the inefficiency of national and subnational institutions in Somalia has resulted in a slow response to drought-related issues. The ministries of forestry, livestock, health and social services have all been reported as corrupt and dysfunctional. Because these institutions are ill-equipped to tackle Somalia’s chronic vulnerabilities to floods, droughts and food insecurity, many citizens find themselves without clean water and other vital resources. Luisa Veronis, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa, has studied the environmental influences on African migration to Canada. She said that the depletion of Somalia’s natural resources as a result of climate change and political conflict is worse than in any other African country. University of Ottawa professor Luisa Veronis addresses environmental issues in immigration policy Somali participants in her study identified deforestation as a major environmental concern in their home country. Wood is needed for cooking and for charcoal production, and deforestation has led to competition between pastoralists attempting to grab any remaining vegetation to feed their animals during droughts. Often Somalis have no choice but to abandon everything and escape these precarious conditions, hoping to reach one of the refugee camps located in neighbouring countries like Kenya. “While living in a refugee camp in Kenya, life was harsh, very hard, no water, no shelter, no sanitations,” Kadir recalled. Kadir was very happy to begin his new life in Canada after he was accepted as a political refugee. He quickly found a well-established Somali community in the Ottawa-Gatineau region. Somalis are the largest community among African-descent immigrants living in Ottawa with 11,000 people. But not all those seeking to escape Somalia will have a chance to settle in Canada. Earlier this month, the Canadian government unveiled a new immigration plan which aims to bring in an additional one million people over the next three years. However, there is nothing in the policy to help people fleeing environmental challenges in countries like Somalia. “People in Somalia who suffer from these ongoing problems simply do not have access to Canada’s immigration system unless they are fortunate enough to have a close family member or other potential sponsor already established there,” Veronis said. If they don’t meet the requirements for immigration, people like Kadir might think to turn to the refugee system, which is designed as humanitarian relief for those fleeing persecution or war. He succeeded in getting to Canada on political grounds. But the Canadian refugee program does not currently recognize environmental migrants as a distinct category. In February, the Refugee Research Network and the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University issued a policy brief calling for the development of a national policy in the area of international environment migration. So far, that has not happened. Abdul Kadir may have been able to escape his life in Somalia and come to Canada, but there are many like him who cannot under the current immigration and refugee system.

### Canada – AT//Quebec Impact

#### The threat of secession is gone.

Reg Whitaker, adjunct professor at the University of Victoria and a Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at York University, August 24, 2002, Toronto Star

Chretien will no doubt be ranked as one of Canada's more successful prime ministers. His legacy, not yet over by any means, with an ambitious agenda ahead for his last year and a half, is a positive one. The country is in better shape fiscally and economically than when he came into office. The threat of Quebec secession has receded. Political tempers, which had reached boiling point under Mulroney, have moderated considerably. But this legacy is not his alone. Paul Martin has shared in it, as has the Liberal party. When it appeared that Chretien was growing unaccountable, the party called him to account.

### Europe – AT//Economy Impact

#### No impact—Eurozone growth is steady and resilient, and ECB policy solves

Heise 15 - Michael Heise is Chief Economist of the Allianz SE. He advises the Allianz SE Board on economic and strategic issues and is responsible for analysis and forecasts of the German and world economy and financial markets and risk analysis. (“How resilient is the eurozone?” http://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/opinion/how-resilient-is-the-eurozone/ 4/17/2015) STRYKER

The worst of the eurozone crisis is behind us – or so many observers claimed last year. Today, with Greece and its eurozone partners constantly at the verge of showdown, analysts and politicians once again fear that the single currency area could be fraying. However, if we turn our attention from shrill political rhetoric to economic fundamentals, we find that the eurozone economy as a whole today is more resilient than in 2012, the last time that Grexit risk was being discussed. We measure the underlying stability of the euro area by looking at the sustainability of public finances, private and foreign debt levels as well as developments in employment, productivity and competitiveness. By collating such numbers into a single indicator, we get an early warning signal for macroeconomic imbalances in the eurozone. At the moment, our warning indictor is not flashing red – at least not if we look at the eurozone as a whole. Although stability indicators have not returned to pre-crisis levels, it seems unlikely that a contained flare-up caused by Greece could plunge the entire currency union into economic turmoil. Over the last year, all 18 eurozone countries have moved towards more balanced economic growth. This includes Greece, although in that country, hard-won macro-economic stability is today endangered by political developments. None of the other eurozone countries today fall below the score that we define as the danger zone of economic vulnerability. The eurozone as a whole has made most headway in the area external competitiveness. Several euro countries that used to have gaping external deficits now run current-account surpluses. Importantly, improvements on the external front are increasingly driven by genuine competitiveness gains: a favorable unit labor cost trend and gradually recovering domestic demand are evidence that external surpluses are not solely the result of demand compression but that structural reforms are bearing fruit. Progress has also been notable in the area of debt. Debt ratios have declined for governments, private households and non-financial enterprises – although the absolute stock of debt remains very high. On the other hand, our ratings are abysmal when it comes to unemployment, which still stands at 11.6% across the eurozone. We also worry about the fact that eurozone exports, on average, are not gaining global market shares. This is a reminder that measures of economic stability can differ markedly from those of economic dynamism. While the eurozone as a whole looks more resilient, there are, of course, big differences between the member countries. There is still a noticeable split between what economists have come to refer to as the core and the periphery of the eurozone. Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Estonia and Latvia look very balanced. They tend to have stable public finances, low private debt, few external imbalances and they mostly manage to defend their shares in global markets. The (former) program countries, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, all have some way to catch up. Greece still brings up the rear in our ranking (only Cyprus scores even worse). Greece has cut its budget deficit and regained competitiveness, but it remains vulnerable because of its mountainous debts, mass unemployment and rigid labor and product markets. Although other peripheral countries are on the right track, they still have their own problems. Portugal, for example, is struggling with the highest interest rate burden in the eurozone, while Spain’s unemployment rate is still 24%. Both factors make it harder to get debt and deficits under control. Fiscal policy is also Italy’s Achilles’ heel. Public debt stands at over 130% of GDP and although the Italian government borrows more cheaply these days than the US Treasury, this might leave the country vulnerable to a sudden deterioration in market sentiment. Italy’s debt burden looks particularly daunting, given its low scores on employment, productivity and competitiveness. Although France’s economic malaise has been much discussed, in terms of economic stability, the country ranks in mid-field – disappointing but not overly vulnerable. Fiscal indicators look steady but have not improved. France’s ongoing loss of world market share stores up trouble for the future. To assess the resilience of the eurozone, we do not look only at how solid individual member countries are. The broader framework also matters. Over the last five years, the Europeans have made much headway in strengthening the institutional architecture of the euro – including banking union, bail-out funds and more meticulous monitoring – that should help them manage crises better. The European Central Bank has proven that it is willing to interpret its mandate to include propping up markets if and when confidence fails. It is the interplay between a more solid eurozone framework and the steady progress that literally all eurozone countries are making towards more balanced growth that renders the single currency more resilient. And it is this underlying resilience which allows European governments to engage in sometimes shrill rhetoric and political brinkmanship.

#### Growth during and after the Paris attacks prove underlying resilience

Soergel 15 - Andrew Soergel is an Economy Reporter at U.S. News. (“Eurozone Economy Resilient Through Adversity,” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/11/23/eurozone-economy-resilient-despite-paris-attacks-refugee-crisis 11/23/2015) STRYKER

In one of the most emotionally trying months the eurozone has weathered in recent history, European businesses thus far in November reported the steepest business activity growth rates the region has seen in 4 1/2 years, according to a report issued Monday by statistics firm Markit. Manufacturing orders from the region climbed to a 19-month high, while the service sector employment posted its biggest monthly gain in five years. "The improved performance in terms of economic growth and job creation seen in November are all the more impressive given last weekend's tragic events in Paris, which subdued economic activity in France – especially in the service sector," Chris Williamson, Markit's chief economist, said in a statement accompanying Monday's report. A Markit index measuring activity in the French service sector dipped to a three-month low this month, and the accompanying report noted that "some service providers reported that the terrorist attacks in Paris had negatively impacted" business. That said, the component of the index measuring French manufacturing climbed to a 19-month high. Overall new business growth reached a five-month high, and business expectations for the next 12 months remained relatively unchanged – which is notable in and of itself, considering most analysts expected the tragedy in Paris to weigh heavily on consumer sentiment.

#### Alt causes to European growth—China, low inflation, and geopolitics

McHugh and Pylas ‘16 - David McHugh and Pan Pylas (“Europe's top economic authorities warn of risks to growth,” http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/top-news/ecbs-draghi-dont-wait-to-act-against-low-inflation/nqJh8/ 2/4/2016) STRYKER

FRANKFURT, Germany — Europe's top economic authorities warned Thursday of the dangers to the region from the slowdown in China, weak inflation and heightened geopolitical uncertainties. Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank, said it was imperative that policymakers act swiftly to deal with low inflation, while the European Union downgraded its growth forecast for the 19-country eurozone this year and warned of further reductions. All eyes are on the ECB ahead of its next policy meeting on March 10. There's a growing consensus in the markets that the bank will follow up last December's stimulus boost with a further package of measures to help nudge up eurozone inflation, which is way below target at an annual 0.4 percent rate. The bank's aim is to have inflation just below 2 percent.

### Europe – AT//Middle East Impact

#### Tensions in the Middle East will never escalate

**Omidi 15**- Ali, associate professor of international relations, Five reasons why Iran-Saudi conflict won't escalate, ([http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/five-reasons-iran-saudi-cold-war-turn-hot.html#](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/five-reasons-iran-saudi-cold-war-turn-hot.html)) JB

In 2011, as the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East, the wall of mistrust between Tehran and Riyadh grew thicker. The civil wars in Syria and Yemen pushed the two sides into indirect military confrontations. Riyadh’s Jan. 2 execution of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, amid Tehran’s protestations, brought the worsening tension to a head. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut ties with Iran after its diplomatic facilities were stormed by Iranian protesters, with countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Bahrain and Djibouti soon following suit, brought about a novel state in the Iranian-Saudi relationship. In this atmosphere, media pundits are asking whether it is possible that Tehran and Riyadh may enter direct military confrontation. The answer is clear: There will not be a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for five main reasons. First, the administration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with the world — which is what Iranians elected him for in 2013. In Iran’s complicated political system, the executive and legislative branches are elected by popular vote, though the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates makes the elections process not entirely free. Within this political system, making a decision to engage in war is not an easy task. Therefore, while some Saudi leaders may beat the drums of escalation, the possibility of outright war depends on factors such as whether there is political will for such action and how the two countries choose to handle the crisis in their relations. In sum, engaging in war is not something that can be done by one side alone. Moreover, Iran’s government has no incentive to increase tensions, as evidenced by the condemnation of the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by the triangle of power in Iranian foreign policy, meaning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. In a goodwill effort, Iran has also announced that it will continue to send pilgrims to Saudi Arabia for the hajj this year. Thus, if Saudi Arabia intends to initiate war, the Iranian public — seeing themselves as victims of a violation — will mobilize, and also gain the sympathy of the international community. Second, the majority of Iran’s current leaders were involved in the destructive war with Iraq and are fully aware of its costs. Rouhani held several military positions during the conflict, while Zarif and his deputies also remember the hardships of that era in their capacity as diplomats. Khamenei, who was president at that time, also served as chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, while Rafsanjani served as the de facto commander-in-chief of the Iranian military. Even Iran’s parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, served as a commander with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Larijani’s brothers, including incumbent judiciary chief Sadegh Larijani, were also involved in the conflict. Many other influential Iranian figures, including a great number of parliamentarians and Friday prayer leaders, also have bitter memories of war, some of them as war veterans. Moreover, although the IRGC at times seems to favor showdowns — such as in the cases of the recent detention of US sailors or its surveillance of the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman in the Persian Gulf — it is not empowered to take arbitrary actions. Third, the very nature of the current crisis makes war unlikely. According to Charles Hermann, a renowned analyst of issues related to US foreign policy, crisis management and decision-making, what defines a crisis are the three elements of threat, time and surprise. Whether the situation threatens the vital interests of a state allows only a short time for decision-making, and whether it occurs as a surprise to policymakers must all be considered. When it comes to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the nature of their crisis does not meet this criteria. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s tone against Iran has even softened in recent weeks. Indeed, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud recently told The Economist, “Whoever is pushing toward [war with Iran] is somebody who is not in their right mind.” Fourth, on the international level, Saudi Arabia believes that in the event of a military confrontation with Iran, the United States and the rest of the West may side with the Islamic Republic. Riyadh’s decision to cut ties with Tehran has received virtually no international support aside from some African countries that play no significant role in international power equations. Even US Secretary of State John Kerry has urged calm following the breakdown in the Saudi-Iranian relationship. There may have been a time when, because of Saudi Arabia’s oil or its position, Washington would have gone out of its way to serve the interests of Riyadh. However, now, even some US elites view Saudi Arabia as a slightly more civilized version of the Islamic State. Last but not least, victory is uncertain in a potential Iranian-Saudi war. Saudi Arabia and Iran may take destructive blows from each other, but both know that neither has the ability to destroy the other side or impose regime change. Saudi Arabia has more warplanes and modern military equipment, while Iran has better missile capabilities and military personnel. Riyadh’s involvement in the Yemen war is another factor that reduces the motivation for war with Tehran. Moreover, the population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province is mainly Shiite and has the potential to revolt — an advantage for Tehran that Riyadh cannot easily create for itself in Iran. Lastly, Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which Saudi Arabia conducts much of its trade, is a further preventative factor, since war would necessitate redirecting all that trade to the Red Sea, which in the short run is just not possible.

#### Water scarcity makes violence and instability inevitable

**Ahmed 15**- Nafeez, bestselling author, investigative journalist and international security scholar, New Age Of Water Wars Portends ‘Bleak Future’ For The Middle East, (<http://www.mintpressnews.com/new-age-of-water-wars-portends-bleak-future-for-the-middle-east/203712/>) JB

Behind the escalating violence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as well as the epidemic of civil unrest across the wider region, is a growing shortage of water. New peer-reviewed research published by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) shows that water scarcity linked to climate change is now a global problem playing a direct role in aggravating major conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Numerous cities in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia are facing “short and declining water supplies per capita,” which is impacting “worldwide” on food production, urban shortages, and even power generation. In this month’s issue of the Journal of the AWWA, US water management expert Roger Patrick assesses the state of the scientific literature on water scarcity in all the world’s main regions, finding that local water shortages are now having “more globalised impacts”. He highlights the examples of “political instability in the Middle East and the potential for the same in other countries” as illustrating the increasing “global interconnectedness” of water scarcity at local and regional levels. In 2012, a US intelligence report based on a classified National Intelligence Estimate on water security, commissioned by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, concluded that after 2022, droughts, floods and freshwater depletion would increase the likelihood of water being used as a weapon or war, or a tool of terrorism. The new study in the Journal of the AWWA, however, shows that the US intelligence community is still playing catch-up with facts on the ground. Countries like Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where US counter-terrorism operations are in full swing, are right now facing accelerating instability from terrorism due to the destabilising impacts of unprecedented water shortages.

### Europe – AT//NATO Impact

#### No impact—NATO and other alliances only risk conflict, and there aren’t any threats anyway

Bandow 15 - Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and served as a Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is a columnist with Forbes online and frequent contributor to National Interest online and American Spectator online. (“Allies Are Not Like Facebook Friends: US Should Drop Useless and Dangerous Alliances,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/allies-are-not-like-faceb\_b\_7142408.html 6/25/2015) STRYKER

If America ends up at war, it almost certainly will be on behalf of one ally or another. Washington collects allies like most people collect Facebook "friends." The vast majority of U.S. allies are security liabilities, tripwires for conflict and war. Perhaps even worse, American officials constantly abase themselves, determined to reassure the very countries which the U.S. is defending at great cost and risk. Indeed, America's most hawkish politicians, who routinely posture like reincarnations of Winston Churchill, routinely talk of sacrificing U.S. lives, wealth, and security for the benefit of other nations. For instance, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fl.) recently worried, "What ally around the world can feel safe in their alliance with us?" The more relevant question should be with what ally can America feel safe? Instead of relentlessly collecting more international dependents, Washington policymakers should drop Allies In Name Only (AINOs). The U.S. should return to a more traditional standard for alliances: Join with other nations only when doing so advances American security. Alas, that rarely is the case today. Indeed, contra the scare-mongering of hawkish politicians such as Sen. Rubio and his GOP compatriots, the strategic environment today is remarkably benign for the U.S. The world is messy, to be sure, but that's always been the case. The number of big conflicts is down. More important, America faces no hegemonic threat or peer competitor and is allied with every major industrialized state other than China and Russia. All of Washington's recent wars have been over -- from America's standpoint -- unimportant, indeed, sometimes frivolous stakes. The Islamic State, Libya and Iraq were regional problems for U.S. allies with minimal impact on America. Iran and North Korea are ugly actors, but mostly for Washington's dependents. The two would face destruction if they attacked America. The latest crisis du jour, Yemen, worries Riyadh but is not even a speed bump for the globe's sole superpower. Yet Washington now is involved in another sectarian proxy war through its totalitarian "ally" Saudi Arabia. Terrorism remains a genuine threat, but falls far short of the sort of existential danger posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Worse, terrorism typically is a response to foreign intervention and occupation. Washington has inadvertently encouraged terrorism by backing authoritarian regimes, joining foreign conflicts, and creating enemies overseas. America has done some of the worst damage to itself when protecting the interests of allies -- fighting their wars, killing their enemies, backing their campaigns, advancing their interests. Adding unnecessary allies obviously makes this problem worse. In Ukraine, for instance, the Obama administration is under pressure to treat a non-ally as an ally -- arming and/or defending Russia's neighbor -- which would yield a proxy war with Russia, a nuclear-armed state which considers border security a vital interest. Bringing Ukraine (and Georgia) into NATO would be even more dangerous, inviting a geopolitical game of chicken over minimal stakes. Neither country has ever been considered even a marginal security concern of America. In contrast, both were long ruled by Moscow, which sees their links to the West as a form of encirclement, capping the extension of NATO up to Russia's borders. Of course, both nations have been treated unfairly and badly by Moscow. But that doesn't justify a military alliance with the U.S. Alliances should be based on interest, not charity. They should not be an end, an independent security interest, but a means to an end, to protect America. Adding troubled states with limited military capabilities and unresolved conflicts turns the purpose of alliances on their head. The U.S. long eschewed alliances and other "foreign entanglements," against which George Washington had warned. Even in World War I, a foolish imperial slugfest of no concern to America, Woodrow Wilson brought in the U.S. only as an "associated power." Popular and congressional opposition then prevented Wilson from guaranteeing the allied powers' post-war territorial seizures. Nevertheless, Washington's involvement was a catastrophic mistake, making possible the Versailles Treaty, which turned out to be only a generational truce before the combatants returned to fight a second and far bloodier round. The extraordinary circumstances of World War II led to a genuine and justifiable alliance. During the Cold War the U.S. created what were intended to be temporary alliances. This policy was justified by the vulnerability of America's war-ravaged friends and hostility of the great communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. But even Dwight Eisenhower warned against turning the Europeans into permanent dependents. It makes no sense for Washington to retain responsibility for defending a continent with a larger economy and population than America -- and vastly greater resources than its only serious potential threat, Russia. Much the same has happened in Asia, which Washington filled with allies after World War II. Even as Japan became the world's second economic power Tokyo relied on the American military. South Korea now has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, yet Washington is responsible for the South's defense. The problem is not just wasted resources, but tripwires for war. Alliances deter, but they also ensure involvement if deterrence fails, as it often does. And lending smaller states the services of a superpower's military changes their behavior, causing them to be more confrontational, even reckless. America and China aren't likely to come to blows over, say, Hawaii, which Beijing has no intention of attacking. But conflict could erupt over irrelevant allied territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Reef, claimed by Japan and the Philippines, respectively, and China. Unfortunately, commitments to marginal allies determine basic U.S. defense strategy. Should America be prepared to fight one, one and a half, two, or more wars at once? These prospective conflicts invariably involve allies, not America directly. After all, what state can actually harm the U.S.? Other than Russia (and to a much more limited degree China) with its ICBMs, there is none. If war comes, it will involve Korea, Japan, the Persian Gulf, or Europe. The greater the number of dependent allies, the larger the number of possible wars. But when the interests involved are unimportant and the nations involved are capable of defending themselves, why is Washington sacrificing its people's lives and wealth for other states? The U.S. should start defenestrating AINOs. Most of these nations would remain close. With all of them commerce should be free, culture should be shared, people should be friends, and governments should cooperate. In some cases military coordination may be called for, when the U.S. and other nations share vital objectives. However, Washington should stop defending South Korea. With an overwhelming resource advantage, the South should deter North Korean adventurism and build cooperative regional relationships to preserve security in Northeast Asia. Despite historic tensions, Seoul should build ties with Japan, another American dependent which should transcend the past and create a military sufficient constrain a growing China. Washington should base relationships on equality rather than dependence. The U.S. also should end its European defense dole. Today, NATO is effectively North America and the Others. Yet the Europeans collectively are wealthier and more populous than the U.S. They should take over NATO or set up their own alliance. No doubt there still would be important occasions for Washington to work militarily with these nations, which share history and values. But they, not America, should secure Europe.

#### NATO fails—the alliance is in shambles

Grady ‘16 - John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News. (“Atlantic Council Report: NATO Alliance at Risk,” http://news.usni.org/2016/02/29/atlantic-council-report-nato-alliance-at-risk 2/29/2016) STRYKER

In Europe, “you find a kind of the perfect storm”—a resurgent Russia in the east, thousands of refugees and migrants arriving daily in the south, terrorist attacks in Paris, the rise of nationalist parties and economies flailing skewing political debates—that NATO is trying to weather. Those simultaneous crises were at the heart of Friday forum on a new Atlantic Council report looking at six nations in NATO and the challenges they and the alliance face and what can be done to meet them. In answer to a question, Julianne Smith of the Center for a New American Security said the time is ripe for closer cooperation between the alliance and the European Union in meeting those challenges and other threats, such as cyber and communications. “We need the capabilities that both institutions can bring to bear.” But what is happening is that NATO is becoming even more a “two-tiered alliance” with the eastern members looking at Moscow’s willingness to battle Georgia over breakaway provinces, its seizure of Crimea, and continuing military support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine as a serious military threat— while southern members confront a rising flood of refugees and migrants fleeing wars in the Middle East and poverty there, in North and sub-Saharan Africa. Smith said, “There is no longer the level of solidarity we once saw” in NATO and the European Union and a growing feeling on the continent that the two are not responsive to the public’s needs to meet these challenges. As a sign of that fraying, she said later that although sanctions against Russia will likely be extended later this year some alliance and union “countries are really feeling the pain” and looking for relief of their own. “The threats against Portugal are not the same” as those Lithuania faces, said Andras Simonyi, a retired Hungarian diplomat now with Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced and International Studies. The idea that the United States will always rise to the occasion in meeting the continent’s security needs “made Europe complacent” ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the alliance expanded eastward, he added. What has happened in their harvesting of the “peace dividend” is that “many militaries in the alliance are in pretty bad shape,” he said. As an example of reduced readiness, even among nations presumed to have strong militaries, Jorge Benitez of the Atlantic Council noted that the United Kingdom had great difficulty fielding a combat-ready armored brigade to a recent exercise in Poland, having to draw on equipment it had in Canada for training. While the report and panel members agreed that alliance members on the continent needed to do more to provide for their own security, there is “no consensus in Europe that a permanent presence [by the United States or NATO in the Baltics, for example] is a good idea,” Smith said. To many, “a persistent presence is good enough for us.” The author of the United Kingdom’s section of the report, however, recommended stationing a corps-sized headquarters and three brigades in the Baltics to deter Russian aggression in that part of Europe. All agreed that simply spending 2 percent on defense was not the right approach to enhancing continental security. The money needs to be spent in a coordinated way and forces stationed where needed, not where it is easiest to send them, Simonyi said. Benitez said the European Union needed to be more flexible in allowing nations to spend more to meet internal security challenges. He noted the union only allowed France one year of increased spending in response of the two terrorist attacks in Paris during 2015 and the same for Italy and Greece to cope with the continuing refugee/migrant crisis.

#### Defense experts agree—NATO is underfunded and unprepared

Sputnik ‘16 - (“NATO Defense Experts Slam Alliance’s Military Readiness,” http://sputniknews.com/world/20160226/1035373693/nato-military-readiness.html 2/26/2016) STRYKER

NATO’s current combat readiness would fail at protecting the Alliance’s eastern borders, according to the North Atlantic Council's experts report to be published Friday. MOSCOW (Sputnik) – The expert group comprising six defense officials, including former NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, warned of "chronic underfunding" and "critical deficiencies" of the Alliance's member states, according to the report, as quoted by the Financial Times newspaper. The NATO report revealed that only 10 of 31 German Tiger helicopters and some three quarters of 406 Marder armored infantry vehicles were usable. "The deployment of a brigade, let alone a division at credible readiness, would be a major challenge [for the United Kingdom]," the report reads.